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"Obviously a man of 67 cannot retire at 55 and obtain benefits
provided for persons of that age. And to effect the purpose of
encouraging early retirement, the sliding scale of diminishing benefits is
manifestly appropriate."2
"The amount of the benefit varies depending upon the retiree's age,
nothing else. Just as in Karlen, the terms of the ERIPs establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination. "3
"The classical theories of physics... can be unambiguously applied
only in the limit where all actions involved are large compared with the
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quantum." 4
I. EARLY RETIREMENT INCENTIVE PLANS AND THE SEARCH FOR A
WORKABLE THEORY OF AGE DISCRIMINATION

Thomas Kuhn' observed that when accepted theories fail to explain
new phenomena, scientists often initially deny the problem and apply
the existing theory-or "paradigm"-more rigorously, even when the
results do not make sense.6 According to Kuhn, change occurs only
when the old paradigm produces so many "anomalous results" that
scientists are forced to rethink their underlying premises.7 At that point
a "paradigm shift" occurs.8 One such momentous paradigm shift
occurred in the 1890s, when physicists using Newtonian, or "classical,"
physics faced a crisis because they were unable to explain or predict
certain phenomena that simply refused to follow accepted laws of
physics.9 It was not until physicists developed a new paradigmquantum physics, which recognized that subatomic events required a
separate and distinct analysis-that they achieved greater accuracy in
understanding and predicting subatomic phenomena."
A similar state of confusion and anomaly now exists in the area of
age discrimination in general, and early retirement incentive plans
(ERIPs) in particular. Some courts are behaving much like the
physicists who unsuccessfully attempted to impose their "classical"
Newtonian notions of physical reality on the subatomic world. These
courts continue to analyze ERIPs under strict "classical discrimination
principles," even while acknowledging the seemingly arbitrary and
unfair results stemming from such an analysis." Nowhere is this more
apparent than in the Seventh Circuit's 1988 and 1999 decisions in Karlen
2 and Solon v. Gary
v. City Colleges of Chicago"
Community School

4. Niels Bohr, Discussion With Einstein on Epistemological Problemsin Atomic Physics,
in ALBERT EINSTEIN: PHILOSOPHER-SCIENTIST 201-02 (P.A. Schlipp ed., 1949).
5. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
(1970).
6. Id. at 5-6 ("Normal science, for example, often suppresses fundamental novelties
because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments.").
7. Id. at 74.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE

8. Id at 95-96.
9. ROBERT H. MARCH, PHYSICS FOR POETS 194 (4th ed. 1996).
10. Id. at 219-20.
11. See infra Parts III.C. and III.E.
12. 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Corp.,13 as well as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's

recent change of heart in favor of prosecuting voluntary
(EEOC)
14
ERIPs.

Before criticizing Karlen and Solon, it is necessary to understand
why ERIPs present such a difficult conceptual challenge. On the surface
ERIPs, which provide some form of additional benefits to encourage
senior employees to retire, seem an unlikely cause of legal controversy.
They are typically favored by employers, employees of all ages, and
labor organizations and appear to present a classic "win-win" situation:
employers benefit from reducing wages and other costs associated with
senior workers and then pass a portion of these savings to the older
employees, who are thereby able to begin retirement earlier than they
otherwise might. 15
ERIPs can assume a myriad of forms;16 however, at their core, ERIPs
are designed to provide incentives for long-term workers to voluntarily
sever employment earlier than they would in the absence of the
incentive. One of the most popular and controversial types of ERIPs
does this by targeting a minimum age of eligibility-the retirement age
that creates the greatest benefit for the employer-and then providing
an incentive benefit that declines each year the employee waits to
retire." The incentive typically is eliminated at an age at which
employees on average would have already retired.'9
13. 180 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 1999).
14. The intensive scrutiny the EEOC is giving to ERIPs is well illustrated by the
agency's recent enforcement efforts in Minnesota, where the state-level NEA affiliate was
pressured to provide information about all contractual retirement plans in the state that
reduced benefits because of age. Telephone Interview with Harley Ogata, Lead Attorney,
Education Minnesota (Mar. 2000). It is especially ironic that this occurred in the Eighth
Circuit, where the decision in Patterson v. Independent School District,742 F.2d 465 (8th Cir.
1984) which upheld an ERIP, was controlling precedent. See infra Part III. Arguably,
although the ADEA was amended six years after this decision, nothing in the treatment of
ERIPs in OWBPA detracts from the holding in Patterson.
15. Erica Worth, In Defense of Targeted ERIPs: Understandingthe Interaction of LifeCycle Employment andEarly RetirementIncentive Plans,74 TEX. L. REV. 411,412 (1995).
16. Id, at 411.
17. Peter N. Swan, Early Retirement Incentives with Upper Age Limits Under the Older
Workers Benefit ProtectionAct, J.C. & U.L. 53, 55 (1992).
18. Worth, supra note 15, at 422.
19. In the public sector, these target ages usually are set when an employee first qualifies
for reduced state retirement benefits (typically 55-57) and at full vesting (typically 62-65). A
common plan might provide workers with $20,000 severance if a worker with twenty years of
service retires at fifty-five. The amount then might decline each year until nothing is received
at sixty-five. Many plans also involve continuation of health insurance benefits. These plans
have been less controversial. But see Erie County Retirees Ass'n v. County of Erie, 220 F.3d
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Central to most ERIPs-certainly those the authors endorse-is the
concept of voluntariness.20 ERIPs are premised upon employees making
their own voluntary individualized assessments about whether and when
they wish to retire. All employees who meet the minimum age
requirements are offered the incentive, and employees are always free
to reject the incentive and continue working without any adverse
consequences. Yet they make this choice knowing in advance thatalthough they will continue to receive their ordinary pay and benefitsthey will, by definition, thereby forego some or all of the "retirement
incentive. "21

ERIPs became very popular in the 1980s when two factors
coincided: Congress eliminated most forms of mandatory retirement
and corporations embarked upon a period of downsizing and mergers.2
Employers, eager to reduce their employment costs and develop a
"new" corporation, sought to encourage the departure of more highly
compensated senior workers. Yet in light of the passage of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in 1967,' and its
amendments, employers feared the potential legal consequences of
simply terminating the most expensive, and often most senior, workers. '
As a result, employers feared using "the stick," and instead looked to
"the carrot" by providing incentives for older workers to voluntarily
leave employment.
Because most of the initial ERIPs explicitly reduced benefits for
each year the employee waited to retire, a subset of older employees
predictably challenged the plans as violative of the ADEA.2 At the
outset, courts uniformly cast aside these challenges.26 Their rationale
was quite simple: because the plans were purely voluntary and offered

193 (3d Cir. 2000) (striking down employer's unilateral change of retiree health benefits,
which provided Medicare-eligible retirees with insurance coverage that was inferior to that
provided to retirees not eligible for Medicare).
20. Worth, supra note 15, at 411.
21. See infra Part III.B., specifically the eligibility criteria of the ERIPs referred to
therein.
22. Worth, supra note 15, at 411.
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-34 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
24. This phenomenon was not limited to corporate employers; it has been the authors'
experience that this also extended to governmental employers, particularly in higher
education and K-12 school districts. Given the current economic boom, the use of these plans
has decreased in the private sector, but they have remained a major focus in the public sector
where there have been numerous state and federal initiatives to contain costs.
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. See infra Part III.B.

2001]

EARLY RETIREMENT INCENTIVE PLANS

only a benefit, there was no discrimination.' Oddly enough, one of the
jurisdictions in which this rationale was most warmly embraced was the
Seventh Circuit. Both Dorsch v. L.B. Foster and Henn v. National
Geographic Society29 ostensibly gave carte blanche to employers in
adopting ERIPs. Ironically, in Cipriano v. Board of Education, North
Tonawanda,30 the EEOC also viewed ERIPs favorably and convinced
the court that ERIPs should receive a reduced level of scrutiny.31 The
EEOC argued that employers could justify ERIPs by considering the
anticipated working life of employees and the payroll savings realized by
inducing employees to retire before their "normal" retirement age.3
The Seventh Circuit's 1988 decision in Karlen v. City Colleges of
Chicago33 signaled the first break in this precedent. In Karlen, the
Seventh Circuit refused to uphold, at the summary judgment stage, a
voluntary plan that decreased retirement benefits for each year
employees waited to retire beyond the eligibility age, and then
discontinued paying the incentive entirely at age seventy-the age
previously used by the employer to force mandatory retirement. 4 In
Karlen, Judge Richard Posner found that the specific linkage of benefits
to age was a violation of the ADEA, at least where the employer
offered no actuarially based economic justification, and where the
employer had previously mandated retirement at age seventy. 35
Although other circuits refused to follow Karlen, Congress cited it
favorably in the course of enacting the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act (OWBPA).m However, because of troubling facts in
Karlen (in which the new incentive plan had evolved from an illegal
involuntary plan), it was not clear whether Karlen prohibited all
reference to age in ERIPs or whether it simply reflected the specific
facts and procedural posture of the case.37
The Seventh Circuit returned to this issue in its 1999 Solon v. Gary
27. See infra Part III.B.
28. 782 F.2d 1421, 1428 (7th Cir. 1986).
29. 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1987).
30. 700 F. Supp. 1199, 1207-08 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1988).
34. Id. at 316, 320.
35. Id. at 318. There was also evidence that the employer had made statements
reflecting age animus. See infra note 183.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
37. There were facts in the record in Karlen that may have colored Judge Posner's view
of the ERIP in question. See Karlen, 837 F.2d at 319-20.
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Community School Corp3 decision. In Solon, the Seventh Circuit
confronted a plan almost identical to that in Karlen, although lacking a
history of mandatory retirement or statements reflecting age animus. In
Solon, the employer offered monthly payments to employees who had
fifteen years of service and reached age fifty-eight; benefits ceased at
age sixty-two. 39 Once again, the employer had attempted to provide a
true incentive for employees to retire "early" by decreasing benefits
based on the employee's age at retirement. Despite the voluntary
nature of the plan-and a record indicating the plan was motivated by
the employer's genuine desire to save money in light of serious funding
problems-the Seventh Circuit followed Karlen and struck down the
plan as age discriminatory.'
Although no other circuit has explicitly adopted the Solon rationale,
the EEOC has apparently re-evaluated its position and is now using
Solon as an impetus for challenging all age-based distinctions in ERIPs.'
The practical problem with Solon's approach is that many employers
will not offer ERIPs unless they provide a meaningful inducement to
older, more expensive workers to leave their employment earlier than
they would have without the incentive program.42 Therefore, to the
extent ERIPs are seen as a benefit to older workers, Solon may kill the
goose producing the golden retirement nest egg. Indeed, even Solon
itself recognizes the practical difficulties with its approach:
Finally, Gary Schools suggests that the plaintiffs have been given
a windfall by having been awarded the benefits (or the right to
receive the benefits) offered by the ERIPs without having to
retire at the age specified by the plans. In effect, the plaintiffs'
victory has transformed the early retirement incentives into
severance payments made to all employees upon retirement.
That argument has some intuitive appeal. None of the plaintiffs
who testified, for example, indicated that she retired sooner than
she otherwise planned or was prepared to do. There is no way to
know on this record, then, whether any of the plaintiffs 'earned'
the incentives by retiring 'early.' That may simply be the price

38. 180 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 1999).
39. Id. at 847.
40. Id. at 853.
41. See supra note 14.
42. As discussed infra, Part III, although employers can still offer ERIPs that do not
refer explicitly to age, these plans are less precise while at the same time still highly correlated
with age and thereby disingenuous.
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Gary Schools has to pay, however, for establishing an early
retirement plan, which turns on the employee's age.43
The authors contend that the employer's argument in Solon is not
only "intuitively appealing," it accurately summarizes the "real world"
justification for ERIPs. Indeed, the authors argue that Solon was not
only wrongly decided, but in fact will work to the detriment of the very
workers it sought to protect by forcing employers to abandon many of
the most popular types of ERIPs. However, the authors' criticism of
Karlen and Solon is tempered with the realization that these decisions
were shaped by the prevailing precedent's inability to articulate a
convincing rationale for why ERIPs should be allowed to tie benefits to
an employee's age. As will be discussed,' a voluntary program designed
to reduce the number of African-American or Jewish employees would
likely be rejected out of hand. The question is: Why should inducement
to leave based on age be accepted in the context of ERIPs?
In addressing this question, the authors argue that the development
of the area of physics known as quantum mechanics 5 provides
significant insight into congressional and judicial difficulty in answering
this question. As of the 1890s, Newtonian, or "classical," physics
appeared capable of predicting the movement of all objects, no matter
how large or small.46 Yet by the 1930s, physicists such as Werner
Heisenberg had demonstrated that the principles of classical physics,
although predicting the movement of objects larger than an atom with
pinpoint accuracy, could not describe the motion of a given subatomic
particle.47 A new body of theory, "quantum physics," was necessary to
describe the movement of particles in the subatomic world.4
Quantum physics recognizes that the movements of individual
43. Solon, 180 F.3d at 855-56 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
44. See infra Part II.
45. For an earlier analogous use of quantum physics to examine a legal issue, see
Laurence Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From
Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989) (providing an earlier example of the utility of
physics as a metaphor in understanding legal problems).
46. See generallyMARCH, supra note 9.

47. Id.at 219.
48. Tribe, supra note 45, at 17. See generally MARCH, supra note 9. It should be noted
that "quantum physics" did not historically evolve as an attempt to predict the movement of
electrons. This came later. The first break from Newtonian or "classical" physics came with
Max Plank's work on the radiation of heat, which he discovered involved not the continuous
emission of energy over a range of frequencies, but the "quantization of energy." JOHN D.
MCGERVEY, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHYSIcs 64 (2d ed. 1983).
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subatomic particles are random and chaotic; therefore, the movement of
these particles must be expressed in terms of probabilities, which
actually leads to greater accuracy than the more deterministic "classical"
model. 9 Moreover, quantum physics not only recognizes that the
previous "classical" model is inapplicable in the subatomic world, it
accepts that, at the subatomic level, absolute certainty simply cannot be
achieved.' Heisenberg's "uncertainty principle" expanded upon this
insight and demonstrated that the very attempt to measure the precise
location of a specific particle-by shooting another particle at itactually deflects the particle from its course and creates greater
uncertainty.51 In short, classical Newtonian physics works quite well in
the macro world, but fails in the subatomic world. In the subatomic
world, the greatest accuracy is achieved by using a completely different
model based on probability assessments.
Choosing the appropriate model is also crucial to understanding
ERIPs, and indeed age discrimination in general. In some contexts,
particularly those involving involuntary, individual employment
decisions, age-based distinctions require the protections associated with

49. MARCH, supra note 9, at 214-17.
50. Id. at 218.
51. Laurence Tribe provides a helpful example in describing the uncertainty principle.
Tribe suggests imagining a very large hypothetical particle-a basketball. The uncertainty
principle suggests that in order to measure the location of the "basketball" particle, we would
have to shoot another particle-a basketball-at it. In Tribe's words, the uncertainty
principle stems from the fact that "if you could tell where the basketball was located only by
hitting it with light particles that had the momentum of moving basketballs, the process of
finding its location would inevitably cause quite a change in velocity." Tribe, supra note 45, at
18. Thus, "the more you try to learn about an object's position, the less you can know about
its velocity, and vice-versa. In any case, the act of observing always affects what is observed."
Id. at 18. Tribe uses the analogy to show that the legal system can, and does, alter social
realities through constitutional adjudication, which in turn can alter the direction of the law.
Id. at 20-22. Thus, courts are not passive observers but are "bending and changing the legal
and social landscape so that.., people will be guided by assumptions and premises and
patterns that differ from those that shaped their behavior before those cases were decided."
Id. at 23.
The authors' use of the analogy to quantum physics differs in some respects from Tribe's.
The authors primarily use the analogy to quantum physics and the uncertainty principles
because of the ADEA and OWBPA attempt to carve out a safe harbor for certain types of
retirement "plans," even if those plans are age-based. The authors suggest that Congress did
not intend for courts, when analyzing whether a plan is "consistent with the purposes of the
Act," to determine how plans might affect individual employees, particularly in situations
where the individual remains free to reject the plan altogether and continue his or her prior
conditions of employment. ERIPs, like atoms, must be measured in the aggregate. As long
as the interests of the protected class are advanced as a group, the plans should be upheld,
regardless of whether some individuals within the group may benefit more than others.
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"classical" discrimination. In other contexts, such as voluntary ERIPs, a
very different analysis is required because the plan is not directed at a
particular individual. ERIPs are based on the predicted responses of a
group of individuals based on the group's aggregate financial conditions
and retirement patterns. These types of generalizations should not be
subject to a rigorous classical discrimination analysis, as long as they are
not based on stereotyping or other prejudicial assumptions and do not
force employees to retire or forfeit vested benefits if they do not choose
the predicted response. Unfortunately, because the Seventh Circuit and
the EEOC persist in attempting to apply "classical" discrimination
principles to ERIPs, a phenomenon that defies classical analysis, it has
created the predictable Heisenberg result: less fairness and more
uncertainty. By refusing to take a "quantum" rather than a "classical"
approach to ERIPs, the protected class itself will ultimately be harmed
more than it is helped.'
Part II develops this analogy to physics by explaining why age
distinctions in general-and ERIPs in particular-do not fit neatly into
traditional discrimination theory. The Part examines the criteria that
have traditionally been used by the legal system to determine whether
groups warrant protection of anti-discrimination laws. It is argued that
in some instances, such as when age distinctions are based on traditional
stereotyping and focus on politically vulnerable individuals, age closely
resembles more prototypical protected categories.
These age
distinctions must be viewed through the lens of classical discrimination
principles. However, in the context of ERIPs, age distinctions are made
to further voluntary plans that are motivated by legitimate economic
and demographic factors and do not stigmatize politically vulnerable
individuals.53 This type of age distinction requires a different analysis.
52. The greatest critic of the "classical" view of age is likely to be the one actor in the
legal system that can overrule the Seventh Circuit: the Supreme Court. The Court will almost
certainly take a "quantum" approach to ERIPs. In its past decisions, although it has extended
protections to age in some situations, the Court has shown that it is prone to apply a model
for viewing age that is diametrically opposed to the Seventh Circuit's approach. Not only in
its benefits cases such as United Air Lines Ina v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) and Public
Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), but also in its equal
protection cases--such as Massachusetts Boardof Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976),
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979), Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) and most
recently Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regent, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)-the Court has shown that it is
quite eager to give employers latitude in dealing with age, even going so far as to allow them
to rely upon questionable generalizations regarding age. In short, in contrast to the Seventh
Circuit's "classical" view of age, the Court adopts a "quantum" view of age that focuses
primarily on age as a group and is reluctant to scrutinize individual decisions.
53. Some age-based distinctions combine elements of both classic stereotyping and valid
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In short, along a continuum of groups requiring the protections of
"classical" discrimination theory, age, although deserving protections in
certain circumstances, is already at the outer limits of the continuum;
voluntary ERIPs lie beyond this continuum altogether.
Part III argues that the current legal uncertainty over ERIPs stems
from the legal system's failure to recognize and articulate the conceptual
understanding of age and ERIPs proposed in Part II. Both Congress
and the courts have struggled to understand age as a protected category,
and to successfully articulate when and why retirement plans can
incorporate age-based distinctions. This uncertainty was reflected in
both the text and legislative history of OWBPA, which appeared to both
support and condemn age-based early retirement plans without
enumerating any clear decisional standards separating the desirable
from the illegal.' The result of this unresolved theoretical confusion is
growing decisional chaos. ERIPs are embraced by some courts as
fostering the goals of the ADEA, but condemned by others as invidious
discrimination."
The Article concludes that, if congressional intent and common
sense are to be served in protecting the rights of older workers, separate
models must be used to determine the legality of age-based distinctions
depending upon the context in which the distinctions are made. Courts
must recognize, as did physicists with respect to the limits of classical
physics, that classical discrimination theory simply does not provide one
overarching principle by which all age distinctions can be judged. As a
result, the authors propose a variation of the McDonnell Douglas6
framework that would not view reference to age in the context of a
voluntary ERIP as direct evidence of "discrimination," and that would
allow employers to escape liability at the summary judgment stage by
demonstrating that the plan was motivated by a desire to save money or
other valid considerations. The authors also suggest that, absent judicial
clarification, Congress itself should clarify how ERIPs are to be treated
under the ADEA by expanding upon its 1998 amendments to the
Higher Education Act, which explicitly endorsed sliding-scale ERIPs in
generalizations; in these cases, great care must be taken since there is an increasing tendency
by some courts to ignore actual discrimination by packaging it in economic theory, even
where the underlying economic theory primarily consists of stereotypical class assessments.
See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that state employer could rely
upon generalizations regarding decreases in ability that are purportedly associated with age).
54. See infra Part III.D.
55. See infra Parts III.B. and III.C.
56. McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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institutions of higher learning."
II. CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE: AGE AND "CLASSICAL"
DISCRIMINATION THEORY

"Age discrimination" is a relatively new and developing concept.
Indeed, until very recently, employees could be fired arbitrarily upon
reaching a specific age; apparently, after the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Kimel, states and their instrumentalities may discriminate
against older workers if the age distinction is rationally related to a state
interest. To some degree, the Supreme Court's tolerance of adverse

57. These amendments read as follows:
(in) Voluntary retirement incentive plans. Notwithstanding subsection (f)(2)(B), it
shall not be a violation of subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) solely because a plan of an
institution of higher education (as defined in section 1001 of Title 20) offers
employees who are serving under a contract of unlimited tenure (or similar
arrangement providing for unlimited tenure) supplemental benefits upon voluntary
retirement that are reduced or eliminated on the basis of age, if(1) such institution does not implement with respect to such employees any agebased reduction or cessation of benefits that are not such supplemental benefits,
except as permitted by other provisions of this chapter;
(2) such supplemental benefits are in addition to any retirement or severance
benefits which have been offered generally to employees serving under a
contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement providing for unlimited
tenure), independent of any early retirement or exit-incentive plan, within the
preceding 365 days; and
(3) any employee who attains the minimum age and satisfies all non-age-based
conditions for receiving a benefit under the plan has an opportunity lasting not

less than 180 days to elect to retire and to receive the maximum benefit that
could then be elected by a younger but otherwise similarly situated employee,
and the plan does not require retirement to occur sooner than 180 days after
such election.
29 U.S.C. § 623(m) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
58. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. Kimel held that "States may discriminate on the basis of age
without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id.The Kimel court applied its "congruence
and proportionality test" used in the City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997) and
Florida PrepaidPostsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999) and concluded that the ADEA is "not appropriate legislation under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
at 82. The Court found that "the substantive requirements the
ADEA imposes on state and local governments [were] disproportionate to any
unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act." Id.at 83.
Kimel's analysis of the potential evils of age discrimination was both insightful and superficial.
As will be discussed in this section, the Court's analysis is insightful in that it recognizes
distinctions between age and other protected categories. However, it is superficial in that
much of its rationale was simply tautological. Age discrimination was not viewed as a
substantial problem because the Court had not seen it in the past as a constitutionalproblem.
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treatment based on age stereotypes in Kime 59 simply reflects our
society's blindness to the discriminatory stereotyping implicit in all
forms of discrimination. For example, until Brown v. Board of
Education,6° schools could segregate by race and the white majority saw
little wrong in this practice. It was not until 1920 that women won the
right to vote,6 and differential treatment of women in the workplace was
not seen as discriminatory until very recently.62 Similarly, until the
passage of federal and state disability legislation, many individuals were
excluded from schools and the workplace solely because of societal
prejudices." Thus, it is not surprising that many acts of blatant age
discrimination, based on stereotypes, were seen by the court in Kimel as
merely a reflection of how society was intended to work. Societies all
too often see prejudice and stigmatization more clearly in hindsight.
Nevertheless, some of Kimel's analysis of the unique nature of age
discrimination is on point. 64 Despite its similarities to other protected
categories, age is different from the other more "prototypical" groups
protected by classical discrimination principles. All people, with luck,
grow old. There are also fairly predictable real costs associated with the
aging process if older workers are viewed as a group. Courts therefore
must answer the following question: When are age-based employment
decisions akin to classical discrimination and when are they based on a
nondiscriminatory assessment of actual economic costs and retirement
patterns? Before attempting to answer this question, it is helpful to
consider the following "thought experiment."
As indicated above, the principal justification for age-based ERIPs is
that the plans offer a benefit which can be either accepted or declined
without loss of employment. Thus, there is no adverse employment
action, because employees can either refuse the offer and continue
employment under their current conditions, or accept the offer and
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)) (upholding mandatory
retirement for judges at age 70); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (upholding federal
statute requiring foreign service officers to retire at age 60); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding mandatory retirement of policemen at age 50). Thus, the Court's
analysis in some respects treats societal prejudices as self-justifying.
See also 29 U.S.C. § 623(m) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (listing exceptions for tenured faculty),
and 29 U.S.C. § 6230) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (listing exceptions for protective employees).
59. 528 U.S. at 83.
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1.
62. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. 21 §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
63. See H. R. REP. No. 101-485 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267.
64. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81-83.
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obtain added benefits beyond what they would ordinarily expect. On
the surface, this logic appears quite convincing.
But consider the following situation: an employer does not wish to
employ African-Americans.' Nevertheless, the employer recognizes
that such a goal is contrary to the law, which it fully wishes to obey. In
order to accommodate both its own prejudices and society's commands,
the employer offers a program that provides a voluntary severance
benefit of $100,000 to any African-American employee who, after
completing his probationary period, agrees to voluntarily sever his
employment and relinquish any right to sue the employer. Assume
further that-despite the employer's obvious prejudices-the employer
does not discriminate with respect to hiring African-American
employees, nor does it refuse to promote or otherwise properly
compensate those employees who turn down the offer.
There is obviously no ruling on such a program, in part, because it is
difficult to conceive that bigotry could be so discretely contained;
nevertheless, it is likely that any court would strike down this
hypothetical plan under Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws.
Yet, under the rationale of the majority of pre-Karlen ERIP cases,' such
a plan would be judged legal simply because it offers a voluntary choice
between the status quo and an improved economic situation. In many
respects, Solon and Karlen do nothing more than treat ERIPs offered to
older workers as identical to the severance package offered to AfricanAmerican employees in the authors' thought experiment.
The question is whether the "retirement program" offered by the
"law-abiding racist employer" (and the individuals participating in it) is
fundamentally different from the typical ERIP. The authors believe
that it is. However, in order to uphold age-based ERIPs, courts and
commentators must be able to articulate a principled basis for
distinguishing between these two situations. In the past, courts have
failed to articulate the conceptual distinctions between these situations,
65. This "thought experiment" is suggested by a quote from Karlen,in which Posner, at
least implicitly, actually acknowledges that there are conceptual differences between ERIPs
and a similar plan based on race. In Judge Posner's words, "[n]or can it seriously be argued
that the concept of early retirement for workers over a specified age stigmatizes such workers,
as would a program designed to change not the age but the racial composition of the work
force by allowing [African Americans] but not whites to retire early." Karlen v. City Coils. of
Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Niall A. Paul, Reduction in Force Early
Retirement Incentives and the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 1989 DET. C.L. REV.
987 (arguing that reductions in force for African-Americans and older workers are identical).
But see Worth, supranote 15, for a partial rebuttal to this argument.
66. These cases are examined at length infra, Part III.B.
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and arguably Karlen and Solon were motivated by the Seventh Circuit's
concern that such a distinction could not be articulated. The following
discussion attempts to provide the conceptual tools for fashioning such a
distinction.
Neither the texts nor the legislative histories of the federal anti-

discrimination statutes provide very satisfying conceptual justifications
for why adverse treatment of specific groups is prohibited. 67 As a result,
the Supreme Court's equal protection decisions,6' and the scholarly

67. For example, in the case of the categories protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
see S. REP. No. 88-872 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355; H. R. REP. No. 88-914
(1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391; The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Text, Analysis,
Legislative History, BNA (1964).
The legislative history of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and
its various amendments similarly lack a thoroughgoing conceptual analysis of discrimination,
although there are references to avoiding inaccurate stereotypes regarding decreasing
performance and age. See S. REP. No. 90-723 (1967), reprintedin 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213; H.
R. REP. No. 90-805 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213; H. R. REP. No. 95-527
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504; S. REP. No. 95-493 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 504; H. R. REP. No. 99-756 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5628.
However, the legislative history of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does contain a
more in-depth conceptual analysis of why people with disabilities require protections, one
that is consistent with the analysis offered by the authors. See H. R. REP. No. 101-485 (1990),
reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,332:
[T]he unfortunate truth is that individuals with disabilities are a discrete, specific
minority who have been... subjected to unequal and discriminatory treatment in a
range of areas, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypical assumptions, fears, and myths not truly
indicative of the ability of such individuals to participate in and contribute to society.
Finally, such individuals have often not had the political power and muscle to
demand the protections that are rightfully theirs.
Id.
68. The Supreme Court acknowledged Congress' failure to articulate a conceptual
rationale for viewing adverse treatment as "discrimination," and the appropriateness of
turning to equal protection decisions to gain insight into the meaning of this term. In General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert,429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976), the Supreme Court observed that:
[Wihile there is no necessary inference that Congress, in choosing this language,
intended to incorporate into Title VII the concepts of discrimination which have
evolved from court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the similarities between the congressional language and
some of those decisions surely indicate that the latter are a useful starting point in
interpreting the former.
Particularly in the case of defining the term
'discrimination,' which Congress has nowhere in Title VII defined, those cases
afford an existing body of law analyzing and discussing that term in a legal context
not wholly dissimilar to the concerns which Congress manifested in enacting Title
VII.
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commentary surrounding them," represent the most developed body of
theory addressing why certain groups should receive legal protections.
The criteria that follow-pulled primarily from the Court's equal
protection cases-reflect the core issues of classical anti-discrimination
theory, and provide a foundation for evaluating whether classical antidiscrimination principles can be applied to age-based distinctions, in
general, and to ERIPs in particular.70
It is quite illuminating to contrast the characteristics of individuals
who are candidates for legal protections based on their age (i.e.,
individuals forty and older) with the characteristics of AfricanAmericans. African-Americans are arguably the prototypical protected
class in this country, and most of the major concepts of "classical"
discrimination theory have been developed in the context of articulating
why African Americans require protections." The discussion contrasts
69. See generallyJOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713
(1985); Robert M. Cover, The Originsof JudicialActivism in the Protection of Minorities, 91
YALE L.J. 1287 (1982); Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect
Class, 34 S. TEx. L. REV. 205 (1993); Edward J. Erler, Equal Protectionand PersonalRights:
The Regime of the "Discreteand Insular Minority," 166 GA. L. REv. 407 (1982); Janet E.
Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protectionfor Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989); Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social
Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107 (1990).
70. Despite the view expressed by the court in GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert,429 U.S.
125 (1976), the authors acknowledge that referring to equal protection criteria as "classical
discrimination theory" is not perfect. One might argue that equal protection represents such
a stringent standard that little is gained by proving age does not fit perfectly within this
framework. After all, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held as much in its decisions. See
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) and cases cited therein. In fact, even Justice
Marshall, who argues in his dissents in Murgia and Vance for protections for age in certain
contexts, acknowledges significant differences between age and categories granted equal
protection, such as race. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to argue this point fully, the authors chose this
approach for two reasons. First, as noted supra note 67, the legislative history of the later
anti-discrimination statutes-particularly the Americans with Disabilities Act--does rely on
equal protection terminology for articulating why it extends protections to people with
disabilities. Second, as will become clear from the discussion below, the authors believe, as
Justice Marshall argued, that the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis of age is flawed
in that it does not treat age differently in different situations. The authors contend that if the
Supreme Court followed the following criteria in a more thoughtful manner, age, disability,
and sexual orientation-at least in certain circumstances-would be entitled to equal
protection. Conversely, if a court applied these criteria in a more nuanced manner, it is
questionable that "reverse discrimination" for whites and men would violate equal
protection.
71. At the outset, it must be noted that although the following discussion focuses on
African-Americans as the prototypical protected class, several qualifications are necessary.
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age with race in terms of a number of criteria that the Court has

employed: whether the group is a "discrete and insular minority;"
whether generalizations about the group are potentially valid, or sheer
prejudice; whether the group is "immutable;" whether the group has
been "saddled with disabilities;" and whether the treatment is adverse

and involuntary.'
A. Discrete and InsularMinority

The concept of a "discrete and insular minority," as first expressed in
the now famous Carolene Products "footnote four,""'

is central to

classical discrimination theory. In Carolene Products, the Supreme
Court attempted to articulate the extent to which it would defer to
legislative authority in certain contexts.74 In footnote four, Justice Stone
identified a number of situations in which the Court would be justified
in placing limits on legislative power. One of the situations cited by
Justice Stone is that in which it appears legislation has been motivated
by "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities... which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities.""

A great deal of analysis has been devoted to examining the strengths
and limitations of this formulation as one of the bases for equal

First, the authors do not wish to imply that the "African-American experience" is somehow
monolithic. Obviously, within this group there exists a great deal of diversity; however, it is
an historical fact that African-Americans were "grouped" by the larger society and subjected
to mistreatment, which the equal protection doctrine attempts to address. Second, although
the authors argue that African-Americans are the prototypical "protected class," the authors
do not wish to minimize the experiences of other racial groups that have suffered similar
treatment at the hands of the majority. Finally, it is important to note that although the
authors juxtapose race and age, the authors believe that the criteria developed here can be
applied to a continuum of protected categories, including sex, disability, and sexual
orientation.
72. It should be noted, as remarked upon at various points in this analysis, that in recent
years the concept of "reverse discrimination," particularly as applied to white males, has to a
certain extent turned many of these criteria on their heads. See, e.g., Julie A. Nice, Equal
Protection'sAntinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive Approach, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1392, 1400 (2000) (referring to "a particularly strange turn in equal protection
doctrine-the shift from protecting classes of people who suffer prejudice, such as AfricanAmericans or females, to prohibiting any use of classifications, such as race or sex, thus
extending protection to dominant classes that historically have not suffered prejudice (such as
whites and males)").
73. U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
74. Id. at 147-55.
75. Id. at 153 n.4 (citations omitted).
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protection." Although attempting to enter into this debate is beyond
the scope of this Article, it seems safe to say that this principle lies at the
core of classic anti-discrimination principles and is worth briefly
examining.
There are actually a number of related ideas embodied in the
concept of a "discrete and insular minority." A "discrete" group of
individuals is one in which the individuals are identifiably distinct from
other members of the larger society.' For example, in the case of
African Americans, except perhaps at the margins, group members are
readily distinguishable from non-African Americans. The related
concept of "insular" adds to this definition by observing that at times
not only is a group readily identifiable, but that it also may find itself in
a situation in which it has been isolated or insulated from participation
in the larger society in some significant way.78 Finally, under the
to be merely
CaroleneProductsformulation, it is not enough for a group
79
"discrete" and "insular;" it must also be a "minority."
In contrast to race, age arguably lies at the outer limits of "discrete
and insular minority" as a useful concept.' Age is the least "discrete" of
any of the categories to which classical discrimination protections have
been extended, particularly as defined under the ADEA. It is difficult
to imagine that the larger society would necessarily view all individuals
over forty as belonging to the same group. Indeed, a perplexing issue in
age discrimination is how courts should analyze alleged discrimination
between class members, an issue rarely confronted in other types of

76. See supra note 57.
77. Ackerman, supra note 69, at 729.
78. For example, African-Americans through much of our history, depending on the
region, because of social stigma, Jim Crow laws, and anti-miscegenation and marital laws,
were not in a position to interact with and certainly not to inter-marry with whites. This led
to almost complete insularity from the white majoritarian political process described above.
See generally GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981).

79. Under the original formulation of this concept, the term "minority" probably was
meant to refer to a numerical minority; however, later formulations, for example in the
context of protected classifications such as sex, expanded "minority" to mean groups that lack
power in the political process, i.e., a "power" minority.
80. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that even old age does not constitute a "discrete
and insular minority" for the purposes of equal protection analysis. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). Even Justice Marshall, while arguing in his dissenting
opinions that age classifications require heightened scrutiny, indicates that the elderly are not
a discrete and insular minority. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 114 (1979) (Marshall,
J., dissenting.).
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discrimination."
Given that age is a continuous rather than discrete category, it is not
surprising that age is not insular. At any given time, a large percentage
of individuals in this society, from all walks of life, and spanning race,
gender, and other categories, will be over forty. In fact, given the role
of de jure racial and gender discrimination in this country in shaping the
workforce into the mid-sixties, and the continuing effects of de facto
discrimination, the majority of individuals who now qualify for most
ERIPs will be white, male, and at least middle class-perhaps one of the
most powerful groups in our society." The power of this group of
individuals was reflected in the success of the Association for the
Advancement of Retired Persons (AARP) in voicing their interests
Moreover, depending on
during the passage of OWBPA. 4
demographics, whether "older" individuals are a numerical "minority"
is highly debatable.
However, to analyze "the elderly" as a group in terms of all
individuals over forty years old is overly simplistic. As individuals grow
older, they undoubtedly do become more discrete and insular. At some
point, popular prejudice might lead employers to conclude one "is too
old" for the job market or a particular job, and society undoubtedly
begins to exclude older individuals to such an extent that they begin to
resemble other discrete and insular groups. Indeed, such widespread
prejudices led to the passage of the ADEA.' But negative assessments
of age take shape only gradually and, more importantly, may be
associated with accurate, non-stereotypical assessments. In this respect,
age is quite distinct from race.
B. Potentially Valid Generalizationor Prejudice?
The Carolene Products footnote, in addition to referring to discrete
and insular minorities, refers to another concept that is central to this
81. See Hartley v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 1997).
82. See infra note 98. Individuals over forty also arguably constitute the most wealthy
and powerful group in our society. For example, based on the authors' experience, teachers
at the top of the salary schedule-which is based on seniority and therefore highly correlated
with age-may make as much as $40,000 per year more than their entry-level colleagues. See
also Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age
Discrimination?:The ADEA's UnnaturalSolution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780,787 (1997).

83. See e.g., Karlen v. City Coils. of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 316 (7th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing that most employees benefited by ERIPs were white and male).
84. See supra note 78, and infra note 303 and accompanying text.
85. Justice Marshall articulates this point in his dissent in Vance. See Vance, 440 U.S. at
114-15 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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discussion: prejudice. Classical discrimination theory has sought to
protect certain groups from adverse actions directed at them not
because of valid generalizations, but simply out of prejudice. This was
the lesson of Brown."6
What is the difference between a valid generalization and prejudice
toward a group of individuals?"' A threshold issue is whether there is
sufficient evidence that the purported "group" is really a group at all.
Assuming there is a defensible rationale for grouping a number of
individuals together, then a valid generalization is a statement about
members of this group that can and has been confirmed by a large
number of observers, preferably using methods that are designed to
eliminate any biases. In the discrimination context, an issue related to
whether a generalization is valid is whether the factor that forms the
basis of the generalization-for example, an individual's race-can ever
be relevant to employment decisions.'
Race illustrates these concepts. "Race," as we ordinarily understand
the term, is not the "natural grouping" that we have historically believed
it to be.89 Race is not a biological reality, but rather a socially
constructed category.' Therefore, most of the generalizations we have
86. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate them from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone.").
87. Social psychologists have taken a variety of approaches to understanding the
interrelationship of what may be referred to as "valid" or "accurate" generalizations versus
stereotypes, prejudices, and discrimination. See generally STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE:
CHANGING CONCEPTIONs 3-12 (Daniel Bar-Tal et al. eds., 1989). "Stereotypes are not
objectionable simply because they are generalizations about certain categories." Id. at 5
(citation omitted). Obviously, the sciences and social sciences are founded on making
generalizations. When social psychologists have attacked stereotypes, they have done so on
the grounds that they reflect "a relatively rigid and oversimplified or biased perception or
conception of an aspect of reality, especially of persons or social groups .. " Id. at 4-5
(citation omitted). Whereas stereotypes can be either positive or negative generalizations,
"prejudices" are typically viewed as negative attitudes about membership in that group. Id. at
8.
88. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that consideration of race
in employment decisions is only permissible in very limited circumstances).
89. See Ian F. Haney-Lope7, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication,and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
90. Id. For example, drawing on the works of a number of other authors, Haney-Lopez
notes:
There are no genetic characteristics possessed by all [African-Americans] but not by
non-[African-Americans]; similarly, there is no gene or cluster of genes common to
all Whites but not to non-Whites. One's race is not determined by a single gene or

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:587

made about this "group" are immediately suspect. In short, most
generalizations about race are simply manifestations of prejudice and
are not relevant in an employment setting.91
Generalizations about age are more difficult to analyze. One
assumption about age is that there is a correlation between age and
This assumption apparently motivated
declining productivity. 9
Congress initially to tolerate mandatory retirement at age sixty-five.' A
number of authors have couched similar generalizations about age in
terms of the "life cycle model" and the concept of "marginal
productivity" as rationales for terminating older workers at a given
age.94 The "implied contract theory" incorporates these concepts to

argue that mandatory retirement at age sixty-five is rational, because, as
the theory goes, that is the point when the employee's productivity
decreases and the employee becomes unjustly enriched. 5
However, this theory simply cloaks prejudicial assumptions about
older workers in the guise of economics jargon. The authors who
defend this theory do not provide satisfactory empirical evidence of

gene cluster, as is, for example, sickle cell anemia. Nor are races marked by
important differences in gene frequencies, the rates of appearance of certain gene
types. The data compiled by various scientists demonstrates, contrary to popular
opinion, that intra-group differences exceed inter-group differences. That is, greater
genetic variation exists within the populations typically labeled [African American]
and White than between these populations. This finding refutes the supposition that
racial divisions reflect fundamental genetic differences.
Id. at 11-12 (footnotes omitted). See also STEVEN JAY GOULD, THE FLAMINGO'S SMILE:
REFLEcTIONS IN NATURAL HIsTORY

185-198 (1985) (cataloguing and refuting a number of

arguments for biological race).
91. Of course, although race is not a biological reality, it has come to be an extremely
important social reality. See Haney-Lopez, supra note 89, at 38, 61. In America, African
Americans have been excluded, because of "race," from the fruits of our society; thus, certain
generalizations about race as a social category are quite useful-for example, that African
Americans are economically disadvantaged in this country as a result of our history of
discrimination-and have indeed led to affirmative action programs. See id. at 1-8; see also
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,387-98 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. See generallyWorth, supranote 15, and Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 82.
93. See S. REP. No. 95-493, at 3 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504,506.
94. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 82 at 787; Worth, supra note 15, at 416.
95. The basic concept is that employers and employees enter into an implied contract.
The theory assumes that there is a general decrease in productivity as workers age.
Therefore, at some point early in the employee's career, when the employee is inexperienced,
and at some point late in one's career, as one becomes less productive, the employer is paying
too much for the employee's services. This is offset by the middle portion of an employee's
career, when the employer is viewed as paying too little for services, in theory to compensate
for overpayment in the early and later stages. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 82, at 787-92;
Worth, supra,note 15, at 416, 423.
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productivity

decreases,

and

it

is

doubtful

that

valid

generalizations can be made regarding all individuals in all types of
work.9 While some individuals may experience declines in physical
stamina or cognitive function at some point, any attempt to apply
across-the-board generalizations to real-world situations would be
perilous at best.
Yet there are some valid generalizations about age within the
employment context that are not open to abuse. Age is a biological
reality. As will be observed in discussing whether age is immutable, age

is unique in that everyone is subject to the aging process. As previously
stated, everyone, with any luck, will get old and, unfortunately,

everyone will eventually die. Thus, one valid generalization about age is
that there is an average human life expectancy.93 Based on this average
life expectancy, a sixty-three-year-old male can expect approximately

ten more years in which to work; a seventy-three-year-old male,
probabilistically speaking, cannot?
Another valid generalization is that there is an average age at which
people tend to retire. Average retirement age should not be viewed as a
function of decreases in productivity, but based on lifespan, custom, and
the desire of most people in this society to forego working their entire
adult lives and to enjoy more leisure time in their later years. This
generalization is reinforced by national and state legislation that, by
96. In fact, the legislative histories of the 1978 and 1986 amendments to the ADEA
illustrate that Congress marshaled a large body of evidence to refute the validity of this type
of stereotypical assumption about older workers. See S. REP. No. 95-493, at 2-3 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 505-06; H. REP. No. 99-756, at 6-7 (1986), reprintedin
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5628,5631-33.
97. Moreover, even if it were assumed for the sake of argument that there is some truth
to these assertions, older workers possess countervailing attributes such as experience.
Unfortunately, despite the large body of evidence that suggests that such prejudices are
unwarranted, see supra note 96, a majority of the Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed
the belief that such assumptions are useful. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 83 ("Age classifications, unlike governmental conduct based on race or gender, cannot be
characterized as 'so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that
laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy."')
(citations omitted).
98. Currently the average human life expectancy is 73.6 for men and 79.4 for women.
Life Expectancy, 47 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. 28 (Nat'l Ctr. for Health Stats., Hyattsville,
Md.), availableat http:lwww.cdc.gov/nchs/fastatsllifexpec.httm (last modified Nov. 7,2000).
99. The authors acknowledge that a somewhat more sophisticated way to look at this
difference would be to look at an individual's complete expectation of life-which takes into
account the specific life expectancy as the individual ages-rather than average life
expectancy. However, for the purposes of this argument, it is sufficient to note that, either
way, real differences in life expectancy are related to age.
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law,"m sets a specific age of eligibility for a number of benefit and
retirement programs. Most importantly, in the authors' view it is a
statistical generalization about past behavior and not about the abilities
of older individuals. In short, this type of generalization does not carry
with it any assumptions of inferiority, nor does it stigmatize older
workers. 01' On the contrary, early retirement is often viewed in part as a
reward for the employee's extended service to the employer," and is
codified in national and state programs designed to assist older
workers."m
Finally, one additional generalization that can be made about older
workers is that they are more expensive than younger workers.
Whether they are also more valuable is a separate question. Aside from
the fallacy that older workers represent increased costs in terms of lower
productivity, there are several legitimate arguments that older workers
are costly. For example, because age is highly correlated with
experience and seniority, older workers on average are paid more than
their younger counterparts. 4 Moreover, on a broad, actuarial basis,
health-related costs do tend to increase with age."' As a result, insurers
are permitted to charge employers more based on the age of the
employee for the health, disability, and life insurance benefits employers
often provide.

100. For example, Social Security eligibility is determined by a "normal retirement age"
that has been set at age sixty-five. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). Indeed a
number of federal programs incorporate the concept of "normal retirement age." See also 29
U.S.C. § 1002(24) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (referring to employee retirement income security
program); 45 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)(i) (1994) (referring to annuity eligibility requirements). As
argued below, it is disingenuous to allow reference to normal retirement age in one context
and condemn it in the context of ERIPs.
101. As even the Karlen court observed, "[n]or can it seriously be argued that the
concept of early retirement for workers over a specified age stigmatizes such workers, as
would a program designed to change not the age but the racial composition of the workforce
by allowing [African-Americans] but not whites to retire early." Karlen v. City Colls. of
Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1988).
102. See Henn v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
"an offer of incentives to retire early is a benefit to the recipient, not a sign of
discrimination").
103. See supra note 100.
104. The authors have witnessed this first-hand in their extensive review of collective
bargaining agreements.
105. Interview with James Utrie, Executive Vice President, Wisconsin Education
Association Insurance Trust, in Madison, Wis. (Oct. 11, 2000).
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C. Immutability

Whether a group is "immutable" refers to whether it is possible for

individuals to enter and leave the potentially subordinated group."° In
effect, is the characteristic subject to change? This is significant from
the standpoint of classical discrimination theory because, if it is
impossible for individuals to enter and leave the group, it is more likely
the group will be vulnerable in the political process.1" If non-group
individuals are certain, or relatively certain, they will never become
members of a given group, it is more tempting to support legislation that
works to the disadvantage of the group."
Practically speaking, race is immutable.Y With the exception of
"passing," which may occur at the outer edges of the category, if an
individual is assigned to the group we call "African American" that
individual occupies the group for life. Moreover, because of "one drop
laws" and other social and legal mechanisms, African American
1
In effect, African
individuals had African American descendants.Y
American-ness has been, in practical terms, immutable not only in the
lifetime of the individual, but also intergenerationally. Therefore, any
political vulnerability that attaches to members of this group has also

106. It should be noted that in some of its decisions the Court blurs the distinction
between "discrete and insular" and "immutable," and indeed the two are often very closely
related. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 113 n.1 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It
should also be observed that the usefulness of immutability as a criterion for equal protection
has been questioned by some commentators. See, e.g., Donald Braman, Of Race and
Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375,1377 (1999).
107. See Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 107, 148-49 (1990).
108. See id.
109. Some writers have argued that because race is a social construct, rather than a
biological reality, societal definitions of race can and have shifted. See Haney-Lopez, supra
note 89, at 38-39. "Race is revealed as historically contingent, socially mediated systems of
meaning that attach to elements of an individual's morphology and ancestry." Id. However,
Haney-Lopez acknowledges that,
Even though far from objective, race remains obvious. Walking down the street, our
minds consistently rely on pervasive social mythologies to assign races to the other
pedestrians. The absence of any physical basis to race does not entail the conclusion
that race is wholly an hallucination. Race has its genesis and maintains its vigorous
strength in the realm of social beliefs.
Id. at 61.
110. See generally VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION: SOCIAL
CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA

(1986). Note that it was only as late as 1967 that

the Supreme Court declared anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional. Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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attached to their descendants.
Unlike race, age, almost by definition, is not immutable. 1 ' It may be
accurate to say that once you are "old" you will never be young again.
Yet unlike race and other categories to which classical discrimination
theory more clearly applies, everyone will eventually become a member
of the class. This weakens age's claim to protected status because,
unlike race, sex, and, to some extent, disability, each person is
guaranteed (under the best case scenario) to become a member of the
potentially disfavored group. Presumably, this type of consideration
helps deter younger people from establishing a society that would one
day disfavor them because of their age.
However, although noting the general validity of this last point,
Justice Marshall qualified this observation by noting that:
[T]he time lag between when the deprivations are imposed and
when their effects are felt may diminish the efficacy of this
political safeguard. The safeguard is also inadequate where, as
here, the deprivation affects only a small and distinct segment of
the workforce, of which few legislators or voters will ever be a
part. Thus, the elderly should receive an extra measure of
judicial protection from majoritarian political processes in
circumstances such as those presented here. l2
In effect, although age may not be, strictly speaking, immutable,
there is a subset of the elderly who are vulnerable and do require
protections, especially in certain contexts. The challenge is to develop
legal principles that can identify and protect this subset of individuals
requiring protections.

111. In the words of the Seventh Circuit in Dorsch:
The progression of age is a universal human process. In the very nature of the
problem, it is apparent that in the usual case, absent any discriminatory intent,
discharged employees will more often than not be replaced by those younger than
they, for older employees are constantly moving out of the labor market, while
younger ones move in. This factor of progression and replacement is not necessarily
involved in cases involving the immutable characteristics of race, sex and national
origin.
Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1428 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1975)).
112. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 113 n.1 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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D. Saddled with Disabilities
The Supreme Court has indicated that a suspect class is one "saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process. 13 This criterion refers not only to
whether a group, because of the other criteria discussed above, could be
vulnerable to negative treatment in the majoritarian process, but to
whether the group actually has received such treatment. This criterion
can refer to both a "history of oppression" as well as present day
disabilities (and in fact the two are often interrelated, i.e., a group that
has a history of oppression often will be currently disadvantaged in its
dealings with other groups)."'
African-Americans clearly meet this criterion. After a brief period
in the late 1600s during which African-Americans may have been on the
same social and legal footing as white indentured servants," 5 AfricanAmericans were relegated to a lower caste position in the society for at
least 250 years.1 During this time African-Americans were enslaved
and deprived of the profits of their labor."7 They were prohibited from
transferring or owning property"' and from receiving basic education." 9
Even after slavery was abolished, African-Americans were singled
out by state-sponsored systems of oppression that lasted, in some
regions of the country, up until the late 1960s.12 African-Americans
were excluded from large sections of the labor market as well as from
many public accommodations. 2 ' African-Americans were not allowed
to vote.'
African-Am ericans were, through techniques such as
redlining, excluded from buying property in the most desirable areas."

113. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (citing San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
114. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
115. Theodore Allen, White Supremacy in U.S. History, in WHITE SUPREMACY: A

COLLECTION 3 (Sojourner Truth Organization ed. 1979)
116. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
117. Id. at 387-88.
118. Id. at 390.
119. Id. at 388.

120. See id. at 390.
121. Id. at 393.
122. Id. at 390.

123. Id. at 393.
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These social, economic, and political disabilities have lasted to the
present day. Any number of statistics can be marshaled illustrating that
African Americans across all social and economic strata are still
staggering under the effects of the disabilities that have been placed
upon them.'2'
Not surprisingly, as with the other criteria examined above, the
extent to which older individuals have been "saddled with disabilities"
historically or currently is quite different from race. In the words of the
Court:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike say, those who
have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national
origin, have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal
treatment' or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities."
There certainly have been numerous instances of older individuals
being singled out in certain situations and receiving adverse treatment
because of their age.' 26 However, because of the nature of age, it is
difficult to see how older individuals have been, as a group, "saddled
with disabilities" in any way comparable to African-Americans. In fact,
older individuals often enter the protected category with a great deal of
wealth and power, and can often fend for themselves quite well in the
political process."
E. Is the Treatment Adverse and Involuntary?

Classic discrimination theory has also looked to other factors
external to the group vying for legal protections, namely, whether the
group is being subjected to involuntary, adverse treatment at the hands
124. See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992); THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1996 (Audrey Rowe & John
M. Jeffries eds., 1996).
125. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
126. These are the types of situations that originally motivated the passage of the
ADEA. See, e.g., United States Department of Labor, The Older American Worker: Report
of the Secretary of Labor to the Congress Under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(1965), at 3; H.R. REP. No. 90-805 (1967), reprintedin 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213.
127. See Evan H. Pontz, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why DisparateImpact Theory
Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 267, 308
(1995) ("Older persons have faced no lifelong bias-any bias that arises does so only later in
life.") (footnotes omitted).
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of the non-protected group."
There is simply no precedent for
extending protections to members of groups-even those who embody
all of the characteristics identified above-in situations where they have
voluntarily accepted beneficial treatment, such as ERIPs; indeed,
envisioning such a situation as grounds for extending protections to a
group is completely counter-intuitive.129
F. Summary: Age, ERIPs and ClassicalDiscrimination

Classical discrimination theory traditionally incorporates a number
of criteria for determining whether specific groups require protections
within the political process at the hands of the majority. These criteria
were originally developed in response to the experiences of AfricanAmericans in this country and then extended along a continuum to race
in general, gender, disability, and age, among other categories. The
concept of "discrimination" that these criteria reflect has its limits, and it
must retain these limits if it is to remain a useful concept."
The purpose of the foregoing discussion is not to argue that age
should be abandoned as a protected class. Rather, the discussion
illustrates that age discrimination, unlike other types of discrimination,
does not fit neatly into classical discrimination theory. In some
situations, older individuals fall prey to the same type of stereotyping
and stigmatization, and resulting subordination within the socio-political
system, as African Americans. However, in other situations, valid, nonstereotypical generalizations are made about age. This is particularly
true in the case of ERIPs.
First, individuals who have the opportunity to take advantage of
voluntary ERIPs cannot be characterized as "discrete and insular
minorities," nor viewed as "saddled with disabilities" as these terms
have traditionally been used. Whether older individuals constitute a
numerical minority varies across time, but at present ERIP-age
individuals may even constitute a numerical majority because of the
128. See, e.g., Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1996).
129. Affirmative action programs have only been analyzed under the dubious theory of
"reverse discrimination;" the authors are not aware of a lawsuit brought by a beneficiary of an
affirmative action program.
Moreover, as discussed below, infra notes 250-55 and
accompanying text, the Seventh Circuit has implemented a very demanding standard for
adverse treatment, even in the context of involuntary transfer with a reduction in salary.
130. Although an extended discussion of affirmative action is beyond the scope of this
Article, obviously the foregoing argument has implications for examining the dubious notion
of "reverse discrimination." The authors believe that, for all the reasons articulated above,
whites, especially white men, simply do not have as valid claims to protected class status in
the same sense as members of groups satisfying the above criteria.
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baby-boom generation.131 Regardless of the actual numbers of such
individuals in the population, individuals qualifying for ERIPs are not
members of a discrete, insular group that has been excluded from the
benefits of organized society. To the contrary, these individuals almost
by definition have benefited from years in the workforce and are
typically in managerial or professional positions."
Second, the group of individuals qualifying for ERIPs is not
immutable. Because aging is a continuous process, younger employees
will likely at some point qualify for participation in ERIPs. Depending
on their level of job satisfaction, most younger employees who do not
yet qualify for ERIPs look toward the day when they may have this
option.
Third, voluntary ERIPs do not constitute adverse treatment based
on prejudice, but rather a valuable benefit offered in light of empirically
based economic assumptions.'33 The ERIPs the authors defend are
motivated by the employer's desire to save money and the employee's
desire to gain a valuable alternative to working until normal retirement
age. Voluntary ERIPs are not commonly-and certainly should not
be-based on prejudicial assumptions that individual efficiency
deteriorates with age; ERIPs posit a "normal retirement age" for many
of the same reasons Social Security and other governmental programs
rely on this concept.'- ERIPs are premised on an employer's desire to
reduce costs without workplace or legal controversy, and an employee's
desire to gain greater retirement options. Indeed, there is a serious
question as to whether a voluntary ERIP can constitute an "adverse
employment action" since no worker is ever worse off after the
implementation of a voluntary ERIP.
In short, age is already at the outer limits of the classical
131. According to Census Bureau estimates, there are currently approximately 119
million people in this country over age forty, versus approximately eighty-six million people
between ages eighteen to thirty-nine. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION
ESTIMATES OF THE UNITED STATES BY AGE AND SEX: APRIL 1, 1990 TO JULY 1, 1999, WITH
SHORT TERM PROJECTION TO OCTOBER 1, 2000 (2000) availableat http://www.census.gov

/populationlestimates/nationlintfile2-1.txt (last modified Nov. 29,2000).
132. For example, the plaintiffs in Karlen were college professors who had been
employed continuously by the college for at least 10 years. Karlen v. City Coils. of Chicago,
837 F.2d 314, 316 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Issacharoff & Harris supra note 82, at 802-05 for a
discussion of the economic and political power of older workers.
133. Solon v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 180 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1999).
134. The authors know from their professional experience that this is especially true in
the union context, where ERIPs are typically bargained for by older employees on bargaining
teams for themselves and other older workers.
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discrimination universe; ERIPs are outside this universe. For all of the
reasons just described, an "African American retirement incentive plan"
is completely distinguishable from a voluntary ERIP that reduces
benefits based on age. As will be discussed, it is clear that Congress and
most Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal recognized this fact, and that
Congress and the courts do have the conceptual means at their disposal
to articulate the differences between these two types of plans."' Indeed,
they must articulate these differences if the underlying purposes behind
discrimination laws are to be fulfilled. Courts can profit from the lesson
learned by physicists early in the 20th century: different types of
phenomena must be understood by way of different sets of principles.
Involuntary, adverse treatment based on prejudice requires one type of
analysis; voluntary incentive plans based on demographics, general
retirement patterns, and legitimate cost considerations require a
different analysis.
III. BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LEGAL
SYSTEM'S UNDERSTANDING OF AGE AND VOLUNTARY ERIPs UNDER

THE ADEA

Unfortunately, the legal system as a whole has not been successful in
recognizing that age must be viewed differently in different contexts.
The authors contend that labeling the age-based distinctions within
ERIPs as "invidious discrimination" under classical discrimination
theory bleeds the term of any real meaning, and ensures that ERIP law
will be doomed to irrationality.6 Yet, as demonstrated below, at
various times the legal system at least implicitly has acknowledged the
need to treat age differently in different contexts. Unfortunately, the
law surrounding ERIPs now appears to be moving in the direction of
applying strict classical discrimination principles to ERIs without even
acknowledging the theoretical or practical consequences.
A. The Early Evolution of the ADEA

Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) in 1967." Congress articulated three purposes in passing the
135. See infra Part IV.
136. Indeed, whether there is "discrimination" at all depends on how the issue is framed
and from which perspective the events are viewed. See discussion infra Part IV.
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). During the debate over the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Congress considered adding age to the list of protected categories, but
ultimately did not. BNA 31; H.R. REP. No. 90-805 (1967), reprintedin 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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Act."3 Two of Congress' purposes were to promote employment based
on ability rather than age and to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment, both of which were reflected in the Act's prohibitions
against discrimination in hiring, conditions of employment, and firing.'39
However, Congress indicated that a third purpose of the Act was

helping employees and employers solve problems created by age in the
workplace.' 4 Congress apparently perceived age as a category that was
subject to prejudices in some circumstances, but which also posed real
challenges to employment. 4

Section 623(f)(2) of the original ADEA reinforced this view.
Section 623(f) permitted differential treatment of older employees in
the context of a bona fide employee benefit plan that was not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act.' 2 Significantly, this

provision was intended to allow employers to treat older workers
differently in benefits such as retirement plans, so that employers would

not avoid hiring older workers. 43 In these respects, Congress' initial
approach to age discrimination represented a fairly reasoned
compromise in most instances between applying unwavering classical
discrimination theory and a more flexible, pragmatic approach.'"
Before examining how, after 1967, Congress' understanding of age as a
protected category evolved, it is important to examine briefly how the

Supreme Court weighed in on the issue.

2213, 2214.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
139. Id. However, the legislative history indicates the primary purpose of the bill was to
promote the hiring of older workers. H.R. REP. No. 90-805 (1967), reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213,2217.
140. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
141. In addition to the purposes Congress identified in enacting the ADEA, there are
numerous factors that indicate Congress viewed age as different from other protected
categories. See Pontz, supra note 127, at 288-317 (citing important differences between the
ADEA and Title VII in language, legislative history, nature of protected classes, and
enforcement provisions).
142. Except that no benefit plan could excuse failure to hire. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1999).
143. See H.R. REP. 90-805 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2217 ("This
exception serves to emphasize the primary purpose of the bill-hiring of older workers-by
permitting employment without necessarily including such workers in employ [sic.] benefit
plans.").
144. However, one compromise Congress reached, permitting involuntary retirement at
age sixty-five, is not defensible under classical discrimination theory because it permits
involuntary, adverse employment action based on the prejudicial assumption that all workers
cease to be productive at a given age.
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In the 1977 United Air Lines Inc. v. McMann1 4' decision, the
Supreme Court for the first time analyzed when age distinctions are
permissible under the ADEA. The Court took a firm stance on the side
of the employer and held that because the mandatory retirement plan in
question had been instituted prior to the enactment of the ADEA, it
was not a "subterfuge" under section 623(f)(2). '46 Although Congress
soon legislatively overruled McMann, the case is still significant because
of the insight it provides into the Supreme Court's perception of age as a
protected class.
In McMann, the Court held that a retirement plan did not defeat the
purposes of the ADEA even though the plan effectively allowed the
employer to terminate employees at age sixty." Arguably, the Court's
highly technical reading of the statute in favor of the employer stems
from the majority's general view of age as expressed in its equal
protection cases. Unlike Karlen and Solon-which err by incorrectly
focusing exclusively on the individual in applying "classical"
discrimination protections where they are not warranted-the Court's
equal protection decisions err by viewing age exclusively as a group, and
by failing to apply classical discrimination principles where they are
required.
The Court's equal protection decisions upheld mandatory retirement
ages for police, foreign service officers, and judges. '4 In these decisions,
the Court allowed the state to rely exclusively on generalizations about
older workers rather than requiring states to determine fitness more
precisely through individual testing" 9 or even bona fide measurements
of the group's overall efficiency. To extend the physics analogy
introduced above, in each of the Court's equal protection age cases, the
Court refuses to apply "classical" discrimination principles to view older
employees as individuals; consequently the Court does not see that
employers are discriminating against older employees by subjecting
145. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
146. Id. at 194.
147. Id.at 203.
148. The most egregious example was in Gregory where the court upheld mandatory
retirement ages for judges even if beliefs about decreasing performance are "probably not
true" in most cases and indeed "may not be true at all." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
473 (1991). Note that these types of prejudicial assumptions were specifically repudiated in
the 1978 and 1986 legislative history of the ADEA amendments. See S. REP. No. 95-493
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504; H.R. Rep. No. 99-756 (1986), reprintedin 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5628.
149. See, eg., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 326 n.6 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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them to adverse, involuntary treatment motivated by prejudicial
assumptions about age that do not necessarily apply to the specific
individuals in question." °
Thus, the Court has apparently determined that because age is
different from other protected classes in many situations, it is rarely
sufficient to trigger the protections that flow from classical
discrimination theory and the Court has viewed legislation from this
perspective. Yet this "all or nothing" view is not necessary. In fact,
Justice Marshall's dissents in the equal protection cases, while

acknowledging that age is different in many respects from more
prototypical protected categories, argue that in certain circumstances
'
As seen below, the type of
age requires "classical protections."151
"paradigm shifting" engaged in by Justice Marshall, when evaluating age
in different contexts, was the view ultimately taken by most circuit
courts and initially by the EEOC in evaluating voluntary ERIPs. The
circuit courts and the EEOC were able to recognize that in some
contexts, age requires that the protections be extended to more
prototypical protected classes, whereas in the context of voluntary
ERIPs, it does not. The authors will argue that Congress intended this
more balanced approach when it adopted OWBPA in 1990.153
In short, the early history of the ADEA demonstrates that both

Congress and the Supreme Court-although disagreeing on the extent to
which it is different-viewed age as different from more prototypical
protected classes." Congress clearly intended to protect older workers
150. This is in direct contrast to the Court's refusal to accept generalizations in the case
of the categories to which it extends "classical" protections. In 1978, a full ten years before
Karlen, the United States Supreme Court held in City of Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power v. Manhart,435 U.S. 702, 707-11 (1978) that even valid cost generalizations cannot
be used as a rationale for requiring women to make greater monthly contributions to a
pension fund. Even though the Court acknowledged that the generalization at issuenamely, that women live longer than men-was unquestionably true, id. at 707, the Court in
effect held that classical anti-discrimination principles prohibit disparate treatment of
protected individuals based on even accurate generalizations. Id. at 708-09.
151. Justice Marshall argues that where "the deprivation affects only a small distinct
segment of the workforce . . .the elderly should receive an extra measure of judicial
protection from majoritarian political processes in circumstances such as those presented
here." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 114 n.1 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In effect, at
some point the elderly-especially when subjected to adverse, involuntary treatment based
on prejudicial assumptions-begin to resemble the more prototypical protected classes, and
require greater protections.
152. See infra Part III.B.
153. See infra Part III.D.
154. In 1978, Congress effectively overruled McMann by amending the ADEA to forbid
involuntary retirement under section 623(0(2). See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1994 & Supp. IV
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from discrimination based on prejudicial assumptions about decreasing
performance. '5 Yet Congress did not question differential treatment of
older employees based on valid generalizations related to age.156 Even
after the 1978 and 1986 amendments, Congress tolerated generalizations
regarding "normal retirement" and "average age of retirement" under

section 623(f)(2).1" It is crucial to a proper understanding of ERIPs in
particular, and the ADEA in general, to recognize this dichotomy and

potential source of tension.
B. The Early JudicialResponse to ERIPs
Although ERIPs had been in existence for some time, a number of
factors combined in the late 1970s-including Congress' first raising and
then abolishing the mandatory retirement age ' 5 -to make these plans
both more attractive to employers, and more problematic. 59 It was
unclear how courts would respond to plans designed to induce older

workers to voluntarily leave their employment. Obviously, any plan
directly tying age to benefits would raise the specter of age
discrimination.

1999). The 1978 amendment also extended the protected group from age sixty-five to
seventy, and in 1986 Congress eliminated the upper age limit of the protected group, although
there were still some limited exceptions for protective and executive employees. See 29
U.S.C. § 6230) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
Moreover, Congress has recently amended OWBPA to provide more latitude to employers in
the context of early retirement plans for tenured higher education faculty. See 29 U.S.C. §
623(m) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). However, nothing in the amendments to section 623(f)(2),
or their legislative histories suggest that Congress intended to prevent employers from
treating older employees differently in the context of bona fide retirement plans. See S. REP.
No. 95-493 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504; H.R. Rep. No. 99-756 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5628.
155. The legislative histories of the 1978 and 1986 amendments to the ADEA illustrate
that Congress marshaled a large body of evidence to refute the validity of the stereotypical
assumptions about older workers as reflected in the marginal productivity model described
above. See S. REP. No. 95-493 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504; H.R. Rep. No. 99756 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5628,5631-33.
156. Moreover, even after the 1986 amendments, Congress was not consistent in
applying classical discrimination principles because it enacted exceptions for protective
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 623(j) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
157. Note that although these generalizations are valid, i.e., distinguishable from
stereotypical and/or prejudicial assumptions about age, they will still not be accurate in each
individual situation. However, in many areas the law allows valid generalizations to be used.
Indeed, our entire Social Security/Medicare systems are premised on generalizations about
when we tend to retire. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
158. See supranote 154.
159. See Worth, supra note 15, at 420.
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Patterson v. Independent School District'Oappears to be the earliest

reported decision in which a circuit court directly analyzed an ERIP.
The Eighth Circuit found that the ERIP was designed to furnish an

incentive for teachers to retire at an earlier age "by holding out the
'carrot' of an early retirement incentive in the amount of $10,000, if
eligible for normal retirement at fifty-five. The 'carrot' [was] diminished
by $500 for each year over age fifty-five until sixty, and by $1500 for
each year over sixty.' 16' The court found that the plan was "entirely
voluntary. "'62
The Patterson court upheld the plan as nondiscriminatory.'6

The

decision hinged on whether the plan was bona fide and not a subterfuge
under section 623(f)(2).1 6 In performing this analysis, the Patterson
court stated "that 'all retirement plans necessarily make distinctions
based on age."" 65 Moreover, the court observed that, "obviously a man
of 67 cannot retire at age 55 and obtain benefits provided for persons of
that age[.] And to effect the purpose of encouraging early retirement,
the sliding scale of diminishing benefits is manifestly appropriate." '6 In
short, although not articulating its decision in these terms, Patterson
refused to apply classical discrimination principles to age distinctions in
the context of an ERIP.
Pattersonwas cited approvingly a year later by the Fourth Circuit in

160. 742 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984).
161. Id. at 467-68 (citations omitted).
162. Id. at 468. Whether the plan was in fact voluntary is definitely open to debate,
because the plaintiff was someone who was not the qualifying age when the plan was
instituted. Such a plan is not completely voluntary, and one of the central criteria in moving
out of classical discrimination principles and into ERIP principles is an assurance that the
plan in question is fully voluntary. However, this oversight does not affect the validity of the
court's analysis of the sliding-scale feature of the plan. The plan could have easily been made
voluntary by "grandfathering" individuals who were already past the eligibility age when the
plan was first instituted.
163. Id. at 468-69.
164. Id. at 467.
165. 742 F.2d at 467 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 207
(1977)).
166. Id. at 468-69. In effect, distinctions were not being made to penalize the older
teachers, but to ensure that the incentive nature of the plan was maintained and to treat
younger teachers (also members of the protected class) fairly. If one accepts that
generalizations about average life expectancy and average age of retirement are valid, then it
is reasonable to suggest that a fifty-five-year-old teacher is trading away more work years, on
average, than a sixty-five-year-old. It is also important to see that if this sliding scale were not
used, sixty-five-year-olds would be "double dipping,"-i.e., they would receive a full pension
benefit and a full retirement incentive at the same time.
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Britt v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.,167 which involved a voluntary
reduction in force. The Britt court observed: "[W]e note that the
Patterson court found.., the sliding scale of diminishing benefits was
appropriate, and instead of representing discrimination on the basis of
age, simply reflected the reality that the younger worker deserved more
wage substitute pay than an older worker closer to retirement age.""
On the heels of Britt, the district and circuit courts in Cipriano v.
Board of Education of North Tonawanda, addressed the legality of an
ERIP that offered early retirement benefits to employees between fiftyfive and sixty with twenty years of service."9 The plan included two
options: (1) health insurance until the retiree reached age sixty-five at
the same level as accorded regular staff members, plus a cash stipend; or
(2) a lump sum of $10,000."0° Plaintiffs were sixty-one years old when
the plan was instituted and thus were ineligible.
The lower court had granted summary judgment for defendants
union and school district under section

6 2 3 (f)(2 )."I

When they reached

the circuit court, the plaintiffs argued that section 623(f)(2) required the
defendants to meet the stringent "equal benefit or equal cost" test,
which required showing that differences in benefits were actuarially
based." The Second Circuit, in CiprianoI, questioned this assertion,
noting that:
Significant cost considerations are often involved.., in designing
incentives for older employees voluntarily to leave the workforce
because those who continue working beyond a certain age will
often draw a salary that is significantly higher than the periodic
payments obtainable under a pension plan. Since the employer's
goal in offering early retirement incentives is often to save
expenses by reducing the size of the workforce, it is only
reasonable for the employer to offer more to those employees
who choose to leave at a younger age, saving the employer more
years of continued full salary, than to those who remain in the
167. 768 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985).
168. Id. at 595 n.4.
169. 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Cipriano1].
170. Id. at 52 n.1.
171. Id. at 52. Once again this raises issues of voluntariness, and once again this problem
could have been easily remedied by "grandfathering" all current employees who met the
minimum age of eligibility when the plan was instituted.
172. Id. at 53.
173. Id. at 54. This was as opposed to a more relaxed cost test using factors such as

payroll savings to the employer. See supranotes 150-53 and accompanying text.
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workforce and do not confer on the employer the sought-after
benefit."

In the course of its analysis, the Second Circuit cited Patterson
approvingly, and twice in the decision indicated that the plan in the case
at bar would have been "more nicely tailored" or "more carefully
tailored" if it had incorporated the sliding scale benefits found in

Patterson.75
The Second Circuit remanded the case back to the district court for
further findings to determine whether the employer could meet its
burden under section 623(f)(2)." 6 When the case returned to the district

court as Cipriano11, both parties moved for summary judgment.'" The
district court framed the question on remand as whether the defendant
could make a sufficient showing that the age-based exclusion of
plaintiffs from defendant's voluntary early retirement plan "was based
on legitimate business reasons and therefore was not a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the ADEA."7 8
This is significant, because the EEOC, as amicus, argued that the

employer had shown that the plan was motivated by legitimate cost
considerations.179 The EEOC argued, based on the legislative history of
the ADEA and the regulations contained in 29 C.F.R. § 1625,"' that the
174. 785 F.2d at 54-55.
175. Id. at 55, 59.
176. Id. at 59.
177. Cipriano v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Tonawanda, 700 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (W.D.N.Y.
1988) [hereinafter "CiprianoH"], vacated in part, 772 F. Supp. 1346 (W.D.N.Y. 1991), afTd,
968 F.2d 1502 (2d Cir. 1992). It is important to note that although the initial Cipriano H
decision was modified in light of Betts-which was then legislatively overruled by OWBPAthe net result was that the ERIP was upheld.
178. Id. at 1201.
179. The EEOC also argued that the plaintiffs, who missed the window period, had been
wrongfully excluded from the plan (i.e., with respect to these plaintiffs, the EEOC argued
that the plan was involuntary and therefore illegal). Id. at 1203. The district court agreed and
held the plan was involuntary with respect to the specific plaintiffs who were not given the
opportunity to avail themselves of the plan. Id. at 1211. This is consistent with the authors'
understanding of voluntariness, discussed infra Part V.
180. 700 F. Supp. at 1206-07. In quoting Section 1625, the court provided:
Those regulations ... provide:
(a)(1) ...Where employee benefit plans do meet the criteria in section 4(0)(2),
benefit levels for older workers may be reduced to the extent necessary to achieve
approximately equivalency in cost for older and younger workers. A benefit plan
will be considered in compliance with the statute where the actual amount of
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plan itself was lawful because it stemmed from age-related cost
considerations and therefore should not be viewed as a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the Act. The EEOC took the position that the
"equal benefit

or equal cost rule"-which

had been generally

interpreted as requiring an actuarial showing-"should not be
automatically applied as the exclusive test for proving the absence of
subterfuge in early retirement plans, and especially should not be
applied... where the incentive, and the choice, to retire early is 'truly
voluntarily.""81 The EEOC marshaled extensive legislative history to
argue that Congress intended a more lenient cost-benefit analysis in the
context of ERIPs, which "might consider such factors as the anticipated
working life of employees relative to 'normal' or expected retirement
age, and cost of the retirement inducement versus payroll savings to be

potentially realized by the employer.""
Indeed, in direct contrast to its recent enforcement activities, the

EEOC argued vigorously in favor of voluntary sliding scale ERIPs
based on a cost-benefit analysis that considered factors as "the
anticipated working life of employees relative to 'normal' or expected
retirement age, and costs of the retirement inducement versus payroll
savings to be potentially realized by the employer.""' The EEOC
payment made, or cost incurred, in behalf of an older worker is equal to that made
or incurred in behalf of a younger worker, even though the older worker may
thereby receive a lesser amount of benefits or insurance coverage ....
(d) "Subterfuge." ... In general, a plan or plan provision which prescribes lower
benefits for older employees on account of age is not a subterfuge within the
meaning of section 4(f)(2), provided that the lower level of benefits is justified by
age-related cost considerations ....
(1) Cost data-generaL Cost data used in justification of a benefit plan which provides
lower benefits to older employees on account of age must be valid and reasonable.
This standard is met where an employer has cost data which show the actual cost to
it of providing the particular benefit (or benefits) in question over a representative
period of years ....
29 C.F.R. §§ 1625.10(a)(1), (d), (d)(1) (1987).
181. CiprianoII, 700 F. Supp. at 1207-08.
182. Id. at 1208. (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, at 33, Cipriano v. Bd. of Educ., N. Tonawanda, 700 F. Supp. 1199 (W.D.N.Y.
1988) (No. 84-CV-80C)).
183. The EEOC argued:
This type of age-related cost/benefit analysis is often applied, even if only on an
informal basis, in establishing "sliding scale" early retirement incentive plans. Such
a plan is, typically, one in which the incentive is reduced by steps as the employee
advances in age. See, e.g., Pattersonv. Indep. Sch. Dist. #709, 742 F.2d 465 (8th Cir.
1984). The incentive may be greatest at the age when an employee is first eligible
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concluded that "evidence of business reasons required to show that such
a voluntary early retirement incentive plan is not a 'subterfuge' would
necessarily be less than that required by the 'equal cost' principle for
other types of employee benefit plans." "4
The Cipriano11 court agreed with the EEOC and upheld the plan.'"
The court found that the employer's and union's motive in
implementing the early retirement incentive was to save money and
preserve jobs by replacing older, higher-paid teachers with younger,
entry-level employees.' In the court's view:
From an employer's standpoint, the very purpose of offering an
early retirement incentive is to afford the employer the
opportunity to effect potentially substantial payroll savings
without inequitably altering its employment relationship with its
workers. Thus, legitimate incentive plans may provide a less
harmful method than layoffs for implementing workforce
reductions and corporate layoffs while allowing the employer to
save more per employee by eliminating higher paid senior
positions or replacing the retired workers with lower paid
workers."l
In the eyes of the court, the employer's motive in adopting the age
fifty-five to sixty limitation "was a desire to have a real 'incentive,' as

for early retirement, and may be entirely eliminated when the employee attains the
"normal retirement age" specific in the regular pension plan (usually age 65). This
may reflect the employer's assessment that larger incentives are required to induce
the voluntary retirement of younger workers, and that it is not cost effective to offer
any inducement to a 65-year-old worker who may already be qualified for a full
pension (i.e., no reduction for early retirement). Where the assessment has
adequate factual support and is based on reasonable assumptions about working life
expectancy, it may be sufficient to demonstrate that the specific age limitations in
the plan are justified by a legitimate business reason.
EEOC Amicus Curiaebrief at 33 n.26.
184. Id. at 31.
185. Cipriano ,700 F. Supp. at 1209.
186. Id. at 1209-10. The court found that the cost savings anticipated by the school
district was the difference between the salary of an older, more senior teacher (approximately
$25,000 per year at the time the plan was adopted) and the salary of a less experienced
teacher at the entry level (approximately $10,000). In other words, the court found that
paying the $10,000 incentive would "have the immediate result of saving the Board $5,000
since it would reduce the payroll by $15,000 (the difference between a salary of $25,000 and a
salary of $10,000), minus the cost of the incentive ($10,000)." Id. at 1209.
187. Id. at 1209.
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opposed to a bonus. '"'s The incentive was intended to encourage
teachers within that age group to retire earlier than they otherwise
might, thereby allowing hiring and retention of younger personnel at a
lower cost.'89 The court observed that "such incentives undeniably
provide a desirable additional option for the employee who may wish to
'retire, receive the value of the package, and either take a new job
(increasing his income) or enjoy new leisure. He may also elect to keep
working and forfeit the package."'"19 The court emphasized that,

[A]bsent a maximum age limit (here, age 60), the incentive
aspect of any such plan would be largely, if not entirely, negated
since all employees would ostensibly become eligible for the
plan's benefits upon reaching the triggering age. Thus, the
'incentive' would be transformed into a 'bonus,' resulting in a
new employment-related cost to the employer without any
concomitant benefit.' 91
It is significant that Cipriano II was decided after Karlen, which, as
discussed below, applied the more stringent "equal benefit or equal
cost" test to strike down an ERIP.' 9 Both the EEOC and the Cipriano
I court disagreed with the Karlen court, with the CiprianoII court
noting that "[a]n employer making [an offer of early retirement] should
not be required to demonstrate the same 'close correlation between age
and cost' demanded of the employer in Karlen in order to take
advantage of the shelter provided by [§ 623(f)(2)]. "'
During the period in which Patterson and its progeny were decided,
the Seventh Circuit upheld two ERIPs before subsequently striking
down ERIPs in Karlen and Solon. In 1986, in Dorsch v. L.B. Foster
Co.," the Seventh Circuit addressed an early retirement plan
incorporating a "Rule of 75," in which employees were eligible to
M

188. Id. at 1208 (quoting Board's Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatory #7, at 9).
189. Id.
190. 700 F. Supp. at 1209 (quoting Henn v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 826
(7th Cir. 1987)).
191. Id.
192. See Karlen v. City Coils. of Chicago, No. 84-C2925, 1986 WL 14649 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
12,1986).
193. CiprianoII, 700 F. Supp. at 1210. As noted below, despite the differences between
the holdings in Karlen and Cipriano, the legislative history of OWBPA cites both cases
approvingly. See S. REP. No. 101-263 at 12 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1517;
see also infra notes 285-292 and accompanying text.
194. 782 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986).
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receive $600 per month until age sixty-two as soon as the employee's age
plus total years of service were equal to or greater than seventy-five
years.'95 The plaintiff argued "that the plan violate[d] the ADEA
because younger workers, who receive[d] the $600 monthly payment for
a greater number of years, received greater total benefits.'" 96
The Seventh Circuit held that the plan was legal.' 97 The court
reasoned that:
Foster... did not deny benefits to employees based on their age;
to the contrary, Foster's plan, which selected employees on the
basis of both age and years of service, showed a preference for
older workers in determining which employees were eligible to
receive benefits.
Furthermore, all eligible employees...
received equal monthly benefits.' 98
Incredibly (in light of the Seventh Circuit's subsequent
condemnation of age-based distinctions), the Dorsch court, in upholding
a plan that caps benefits at age sixty-two, cited the Patterson case
approvingly for the proposition that, "[o]bviously a man of 67 cannot
retire at 55 and obtain benefits provided for persons of that age. And to
effect the purpose of early retirement, the sliding scale of diminishing
benefits is manifestly appropriate." "9

The Seventh Circuit in Dorsch also acknowledged some of the
conceptual differences between age and other protected categories
when it stated that:
The progression of age is a universal human process. In the very
nature of the problem, it is apparent that in the usual case, absent
any discriminatory intent, discharged employees will more often
than not be replaced by those younger than they, for older
employees are constantly moving out of the labor market, while
younger ones move in.
This factor of progression and
195. Id. at 1423.
196. Id. at 1427.
197. Id. at 1429.
198. Id. In the course of its analysis, the court indicates that the plaintiff in Dorsch also
attempted to establish a disparate impact claim. Id. at 1427. However, as will be seen below,
the Seventh Circuit, even as of Dorsch, and certainly in later cases, believed "[t]he adverse
impact analysis developed in Title VII cases cannot be extended easily to age cases." Id. at
1428 (citing Cunningham v. Cent. Beverage, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 59,62-63 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
199. 782 F.2d at 1428 (citing Patterson v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 742 F.2d 465, 468-69 (8th Cir.
1984)).
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replacement is not necessarily involved in cases involving the
immutable characteristics of race, sex and national origin.'
In its 1987 decision in Henn v. National Geographic Society,20 the
Seventh Circuit examined a second ERIP, in which the employer
offered every employee over fifty-five the option of early retirement.'
The Seventh Circuit upheld the plan, and indicated that it refused to
view every reference to age in an early retirement plan as prima facie
age discrimination.m The Seventh Circuit held that the employer must
raise the section 623(f)(2) defense only if the plaintiff states a prima
facie case, and that the facts in Henn did not rise to such a level!2 4 In the
words of the court:
An employee to whom the offer has been extended-such as our
four plaintiffs-is the beneficiary of any distinction on the basis
of age.
None can claim to be adversely affected by
discrimination in the design or offer of the early retirement
package. So in a suit by someone in the favored group, [§
623(f)(2)] never comes into play.'
In arriving at this conclusion, Henn cites 29 C.F.R. section 1625.9(f),
which states that "neither section [623(f)(2)] nor any other provision of
the [ADEA] makes it unlawful for a plan to permit individuals to elect
early retirement at a specified age at their own option."' ' In the words
of the court, "[a]s we have explained, an offer of incentives to retire
early is a benefit to the recipient, not a sign of discrimination. Taken
together, these two events-one neutral, one beneficial to the older
In
employee-do not support an inference of age discrimination.",2
200. Id. (citing Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307,313 (6th Cir. 1975)).
201. 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1987).

202. Id. at 826.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 828.
Id. at 827-28.
Id. at 827 (citations omitted) (emphasis on original).
Id. at 827-28.
Id. at 828. Once again, the Seventh Circuit also addressed a disparate impact

argument:
[A]lthough the record may well support an inference that the Society wanted to
reduce the average age of its sales staff, this does not show that it used illegal means.
Any early retirement program reduces average age, because only older employees
are eligible to retire. That the Society favored the results of its program does not
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addition to the cases already discussed, Henn cites a number of other
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decisionsm which "treated offers of
early retirement benefits in the way we [the Seventh Circuit] have found
natural-as favors to the older employees, about which they cannot
complain. "'09

Up until the 1988 Karlen decision, the circuits were in general
agreement that voluntary ERIPs were not discriminatory. '0 The circuit
courts almost uniformly found that age distinctions within voluntary
ERIPs were consistent with the purposes of the ADEA.

11

The courts-

and the EEOC-arrived at this conclusion because, rather than singling
out vulnerable members of society for negative treatment based on
prejudice, ERIPs provided older people in the workforce with the
choice of either continuing to work or voluntarily leaving the workforce
in return for valuable benefits. Both the EEOC and the circuit courts

recognized that such an arrangement did not constitute "discrimination"
as that term has traditionally been understood or as it was intended to
be understood by Congress in passing the ADEA. At most, circuit
condemn the program.
Id. at 830.
208. Id. at 827 (citing Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251 (1st Cir. 1986);
Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ackerman v.
Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1982)).
209. Id. at 827.
210. One final case is Bodnar v. Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1988). In Bodnar,
the Fifth Circuit upheld an early retirement incentive plan, stating that "[iun general an
employer's adoption of an early retirement plan does not create a prima facie case of age
discrimination under the ADEA." Id. at 192. The court stated, "[w] e need not recite the
manifold reasons that justify such plans and render them, in many situations, the fairest
alternative available to a company." Id. The court then cited the Seventh Circuit's Henn
decision for the proposition that ERIPs give older employees valuable benefits. Id. at 192-93.
The authors' research has not revealed any circuit court cases from this period of time in
which a voluntary ERIP was held to be discriminatory. See also Rebecca S. Stith & William
A. Kohlburn, Early Retirement Incentive PlansAfter the Passageof the Older Workers Benefit
ProtectionAct, 11 ST. LOuIS U. PUB. L. REV. 263,264-65 (1992).
[T]hose circuits which addressed the permissibility of ERIPs prior to the passage of
OWBPA ruled with virtual unanimity that the offer of an early retirement incentive,
alone, is lawful under the ADEA and actually may be a benefit to older workers
rather than a detriment. Only a Second Circuit opinion [Paolillo v. Dresser
Industries, 813 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1987)], handed down prior to OWBPA, held that
retirement under an ERIP creates a prima facie case of age discrimination and the
court subsequently withdrew the decision before publication. The Paolillocourt
substituted an opinion that presumed the offer of an ERIP is valid under the
ADEA.
Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1987).
211. For a similar conclusion, see Worth, supranote 15, at 414.
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courts gave some level of scrutiny to "sliding scale" type plans, and held
that a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case by bringing forth
evidence of explicit age distinctions. However, these courts placed only
a minimal burden on the employer to prevail on the section 623(f)(2)
affirmative defense, one that could be established at the summary
judgment stage. In fact, many courts viewed the "sliding-scale" plan as
quite rational, and perhaps even the most rational and most fair to all
parties involved.
C. The Karlen Decision and the Seeds of Uncertainty

In essence, prior to Karlen, it appeared that Congress, the courts,
and the EEOC all agreed that ERIPs should not be judged under
classical discrimination principles. This picture changed dramatically in
1988 with the Seventh Circuit's Karlen decision." 2 The early retirement
program at issue in Karlen was open to faculty between fifty-five and
sixty-nine years of age who had been continuously employed by the
college for at least ten years.1 3 Two features of the plan were keyed to
age. First, individuals between fifty-five and fifty-eight years old
received fifty percent of accumulated sick pay in addition to a pension.214
This rose to sixty percent for fifty-nine year olds and eighty percent for
sixty to sixty-four year-olds, and then dropped to forty-five percent for
sixty-five to seventy year-olds.215 Note that the benefit actually rose
between ages fifty-nine and sixty, and then the drop-off was only five
percent less for those between sixty-five and seventy years old than for
those between fifty-five and fifty-eight years old. It is not clear from the
circuit or district court 1 6 decisions whether employees were entitled to
accumulated sick pay absent the ERIP; thus, it is not clear whether
employees who did not choose the ERIP were stripped of a vested
benefit. Second, the plaintiffs challenged the portion of the plan that
permitted faculty members who retired between fifty-five and sixty-four
to continue to be covered by the college's group insurance policy until
they reached age seventy, while denying coverage to those who retired

212. Karlen v. City Coils. of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1988).
213. 1d.'at 316.
214. Id.

215. Id.
216. Karlen v. City Coils. of Chicago, No. 84-C2925, 1986 WL 14649 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12,
1986).
217. Obviously, as argued throughout the Article, this would change the analysis of the
plan in that it would no longer be truly voluntary.
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Also complicating matters was the
at age sixty-five or later.218
mandatory retirement policy,219 as
illegal,
age-sixty-five
employer's prior
well as several employer comments seemingly disparaging "old
timers." n
On these facts, the Karlen court held that the plaintiffs had stated a
prima facie case of age discrimination, and that the defendant had not
sufficiently rebutted the inference of age discrimination to prevail on
summary judgment. 22' The actual holding is not remarkable given the
case's factual and procedural underpinnings. What is troubling is the
court's analysis. If the Seventh Circuit was attempting to formulate
general principles for evaluating all age distinctions within ERIPs,
These
Karlen raises a number of problems and inconsistencies.'
problems are first examined by observing the contradictions within the
Karlen decision itself.
Before condemning the ERIP in question, the court acknowledged a
host of reasons to support age-differential treatment in the context of
ERIPs. For example, in support of ERIPs, the decision acknowledges:
[T]he discrimination seems to be in favor of rather than against
older employees, by giving them an additional option and one
prized by many older employees. Nor can it seriously be argued
that the concept of early retirement... stigmatizes such workers,
as would a program designed to change not the age but the racial
composition of the work force by allowing [African-Americans]
but not whites to retire early. Entitlement to early retirement is
a valued perquisite of age-an additional option available only to
the older worker and only slightly tarnished by the knowledge
that sometimes employers offer it because they want to ease out
older workers.2 3

218. Karlen, 837 F.2d at 316. However, the court acknowledges that although this
benefit scheme results in differences in benefits between older and younger retirees, the older
retirees have gained a number of valuable benefits by remaining employed. Id. at 317.
219. Id. at 316.
220. Id. It is also important to recognize the summary judgment posture of the case. IdL
at 319. In light of the troubling facts and the procedural posture, Judge Posner indicated that
the employer should be required to prove its affirmative defense at trial, id., and indicated
that the holding is limited to sending the case back for trial. Id. at 320.
221. Id. at 318.
222. The underlying conceptual problems of the Karlen court's attempt to apply classical
discrimination principles to age have already been discussed at length in supra Part II.
223. Karlen, 837 F.2d at 317.
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Additionally, Karlen acknowledges that the ADEA generally
When
supports rather than condemns early retirement plans.'
referring to differential treatment of "younger" workers within the
protected category, Karlen states that absent such differential treatment,
"early retirement plans would effectively be outlawed, and that was not
the intent of the framers of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act."s
Yet, even after acknowledging that ERIPs are benevolent and
consistent with the ADEA, Karlen proceeds to condemn them. After
acknowledging that age-especially in the context of ERIPs-differs
from other protected groups, Karlen attempts to apply classical
discrimination principles to the plan in question. The futility of such an
attempt is immediately apparent when the court asserts that classical
principles must be applied without modification, yet that they can also
tolerate age-based distinctions within the protected class. 26 The
Karlen court acknowledges that some differential treatment is
acceptable for members in the protected group, as long as it only
deprives the "younger" employees of benefits.' However, if the court
is really serious about the application of classical discrimination
principles to older workers, how can it tolerate any distinctions based on
membership in this category? If the court really wants to apply classical
discrimination principles, is it not giving sixty year-olds more favorable
treatment than forty year-olds-by allowing them to participate in
ERIPs-like saying that lighter skinned African-Americans do not
qualify for protections to the same degree as darker skinned AfricanAmericans?
Similarly, the court applied the stringent "equal benefit or equal
cost" test with regard to older members of the protected class, without
considering the significant cost to "younger" members of the protected
class. Statistically speaking, an employee who retires at age fifty-five
gives up ten more years of employment than an individual who retires at
age sixty-five. If all older employees must be treated equally, why
M

224. Id. at318.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 318.
227. Id. ("Title VII protects whites and men as well as blacks and women, but the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act does not protect the young as well as the old, or even, we
think, the younger againstthe older.") (emphasis on original).
228. Id. The Court does not recognize in its analysis the fact that, by continuing to work,
older employees receive more years of pay and benefits than the younger retirees who forego
these additional benefits by leaving employment.
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wouldn't the court require the employer to compensate employees
equally for each year of employment the individual foregoes?
Moreover, given that the court acknowledges that ERIP benefits are
a valued "perquisite,"' 9 how can granting these benefits be taken as a
sign of age discrimination? This is especially problematic .in light of the
fact that the benefits initially increasewith age between the ages of fiftyfive and sixty-four.m If the employer were really motivated by age
animus in establishing the plan, why would the employer design a plan
that treats members of the "scorned" group better than their younger
counterparts? Looking at the changes in benefit levels another way, it is
not clear why the court believes decreasing benefits is indicative of
discrimination at all. If the benefits are an incentive being used to "get
rid of" the "scorned" group, and greater benefits are given to younger
employees, then is it not the correct inference that the employer wishes
to encourage the younger worker to leave? And, even assuming that
decreasing benefits is indicative of discrimination, is it really rational to
believe that the employer "likes" sixty-four year olds but suddenly
develops age animus toward sixty-five year olds?23' The bottom line is
that, in the context of a "sliding scale" type plan, it is difficult to believe
that an employer would subdivide its prejudice toward older workers
into one-year subsections.
Not only is Karlen's analysis of ERIPs internally inconsistent, the
attempt to apply classical discrimination principles to ERIPs is also
inconsistent with other collateral classical discrimination principles that
would otherwise be controlling nationally or in the Seventh Circuit.
There are a number of arguments that Karlen scrutinizes ERIPs more
rigorously than the Seventh Circuit would scrutinize other employment
decisions where the employer's actions are far more troubling.
1. After Hartley, Is A One-Year Difference Really Prima Facie
Discrimination?
The Karlen decision (and later Solon) suggests that the difference in
the treatment of sixty-five year olds and sixty-four year olds under the
229. 837 F.2d at 317.
230. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
231. This explanation fails "Ockham's razor" (otherwise known as the "Principle of
Parsimony"), which holds that when confronted by two rival theories, one should choose the
simplest explanation. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1280, 1645

(3rd ed. 1976). In this case, the simplest explanation of this plan is that it is intended to
benefit the employer not because it satisfies the employer's discriminatory animus, but
because it is in the employer's economic interest.
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plan in question creates a prima facie case of age discrimination. Yet in
Hartley v. Wisconsin Beli--in which the fifty-one year old plaintiff had
been terminatede 3 -the Seventh Circuit held that the ADEA requires
that a disparity in age must be sufficient to create a reasonable inference
of age discrimination.2m The court further explained that the rule in the
Seventh Circuit is that a plaintiff cannot "necessarily carry her initial
burden under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme by
offering evidence only that her employer favored a younger
employee." 5 The Hartley court then concluded that not only does the
favored employee need to be "substantially younger" to trigger the
McDonnell Douglas analysis," the difference in age necessary to meet
the "presumptively substantial" test is ten years.'
This, of course, prompts the question: Why then does the Seventh
Circuit believe that the one-year age distinctions in Karlen create a
prima facie case of discrimination?m The underlying assumption in
Hartley appears to be that age is different from other categories. From
both a practical and judicial perspective, a one-year age difference is not
as significant as the distinction between African-American and white, or
male and female. This led the Hartley court to conclude that, even
where the plaintiff had been terminated, she did not raise the inference
of discrimination." 9 Yet the Karlen court clings so rigidly to a classical
discrimination model that it views2 a similar one-year age distinction as
strong evidence of discrimination. 1
232. 124 F.3d 887, 892-93 (7th Cir. 1997).

233. Id. at 889.
234. Id. at 892.

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id-at 893. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit also appears to treat age differently
from other categories in cases involving plaintiffs' attempts to prove discrimination through
direct evidence. The Seventh Circuit has held that in evaluating statements that arguably
reflect discriminatory animus-i.e., direct evidence-it is "significant, though perhaps not
dispositive," that the person who made the remark was in the protected category. Mills v.

First Fed. Say. & Loan, 83 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 1996). Once again, it is hard to see how the
Seventh Circuit can reconcile such a holding with Karlen, and later Solon, in which, almost
assuredly, the employer and employee representatives, and members of the bargaining teams,
were members of the protected category.
238. Significantly, the Karlen decision arguably does not hold that an ERIP--even an
age-based sliding scale ERIP--constitutes direct evidence of discrimination. Karlen v. City
Coils. of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1988). Rather, the court appears to indicate that
even ERIPs that make explicit age distinctions trigger the same McDonnell Douglass
paradigm-albeit in slightly modified form-as at issue in Hartley.
239. See Hartley, 124 F.3d at 893.
240. The Seventh Circuit in the Solon decision not only viewed such a distinction as
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2. If Age Must Always Be Viewed Via Classical Discrimination
Principles, How Can There Be No "Disparate Impact" For Age?

Karlen implies that "classical" discrimination principles must be
applied to age. Yet in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 41 although the case

focused on disparate treatment, a majority of the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the disparate impact theory of liability has not been
extended to age. 42 The concurring opinion was more explicit, stating
"there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over
'
disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA."243

Two

subsequent Seventh Circuit cases reinforce this suggestion. '4
Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has
expressly articulated the rationale for refusing to allow would-be age
discrimination plaintiffs to rely on the disparate impact analysis, but it
appears related to the inherent problem in age discrimination of
recognizing and differentiating impermissible stereotyping from valid
economic generalizations.
The Seventh Circuit's attempt to use classical discrimination
principles to evaluate the ERIP in Karlen contradicts this implicit

reasoning. If the Seventh Circuit really were serious about applying
classical discrimination principles to age, even in the context of ERIPs,
then it would follow that the disparate impact analysis should also apply
to age.245
"discrimination," but also went so far as to award double damages. See infra notes 312-26 and
accompanying text.
241. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
242. Id. at 609-10.
243. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994); EEOC v.
Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Pontz, supra note 127, at 314
("The Francis Parker court used the Hazen decision as overwhelming proof that disparate
impact doctrine should not be applied to the ADEA ....
").
245. Arguing for or against the disparate impact theory being applied to age is beyond
the scope of this Article. However, as argued throughout this Article, the crucial point is that
the legal system must develop a conceptually sound approach to age discrimination and apply
it in a consistent manner. For a more detailed analysis of age and disparate impact, see Pontz,
supra note 127, at 308.
Two additional anomalies in the Seventh Circuit's treatment of age should be noted. First, in
1978, a full ten years before Karlen, the United States Supreme Court held in City of Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-11 (1978) that even
valid cost generalizations cannot be used as a rationale for requiring women to make greater
monthly contributions to a pension fund. Even though the Court acknowledged that the
generalization at issue-namely, that women live longer than men-was unquestionably true,
id. at 707, the Court in effect held that classical anti-discrimination principles prohibit
disparate treatment of protected individuals based on even accurate generalizations. Id. at
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3. After Vande Zande's "Proportionality" Analysis, Why Would "Equal
Benefit or Equal Cost" Apply To Age And Not Disability?
Viewed in terms of classical discrimination principles, disabled
employees arguably resemble the prototypical protected classes more
closely than older employees-especially the subset of older employees
who have the opportunity to choose ERIPs. Thus, it would seem to

follow that courts would subject employer economic justifications to
greater scrutiny in the context of a disability than in the context of
ERIPs. But this is not the case, at least in the Seventh Circuit.
In Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration,46 the

Seventh Circuit developed a concept that may be referred to as
247 Proportionality not only protects employers from
proportionality.
having to undergo "undue hardship" in complying with the ADEA, but
also requires the cost of the accommodations to be "in proportion" to
the benefits of the accommodations or to the employer's financial
status.248 According to the court:
[W]e do not think an employer has a duty to expend even modest
amounts of money to bring about an absolute identity in working
conditions between disabled and nondisabled workers. The
creation of such a duty would be the inevitable consequence of
deeming a failure to achieve identical conditions "stigmatizing."
That is merely an epithet. We conclude that access to a
particular [object], when access to an equivalent [object],
conveniently located, is provided, is not a legal duty of an
708-09. Following this line of reasoning, if the Seventh Circuit were really serious about
applying classical discrimination principles to individuals participating in ERIPs, it should not
have viewed any cost considerations as justification for differential treatment of individuals
within this group. However, as seen below, the Seventh Circuit, although employing a far
more rigorous definition of "costs" than had been endorsed up to that time by other circuit
courts of appeal and the EEOC, nonetheless allowed distinctions between protected group
members to be justified by cost. In short, the Seventh Circuit developed a standard that
implicitly recognizes that age differs from other protected categories in important ways, yet
requires a standard of proof that obscures these differences.
The second anomaly is the Seventh Circuit's refusal to find "reverse discrimination" in the
context of age, whereas it does recognize claims of reverse discrimination in the context of
other, more "classical" protected categories such as race and sex. Compare Hamilton v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the Seventh Circuit does not
recognize reverse age discrimination claims) with Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168 (7th
Cir., 1992) (holding that the Seventh Circuit does recognize claims of reverse discrimination
based on sex).
246. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
247. Id. at 543.
248. Id at 542.
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employer. The duty of reasonable accommodation is satisfied
when the employer does what is necessary to enable the disabled
worker to work in reasonable comfort. 24 9
As argued above, the age distinctions within a sliding-scale ERIP
can hardly be called "stigmatizing." Moreover, from both a policy and
legal perspective, it seems incongruous to hold that employers have "no
duty to expend even modest amounts of money to bring about an
absolute identity" in dealing with a disabled employee. This is true even
where there is an affirmative duty to accommodate, while holding the
employer to the much more demanding principle of the "equal benefit
or equal cost" standard articulated in Karlen in the context of an ERIP.
4. Does The Offer Of An Early Retirement Incentive Really Constitute
An Adverse Impact? (Or "Why Does A 'Law And Economics' Court
Interfere With A Voluntary Transaction?")
The Seventh Circuit and Judge Posner have made it very clear that a
finding of age discrimination is only warranted when the threshold
requirement of a "materially adverse employment action" has been
met. ° Judge Posner has applied a relatively rigorous standard for
determining whether even an involuntary employment action rises to
the level of "materially adverse. ""
For example, a salesman who was transferred to a new product line
in which his commission income-amounting to 10.7% of his total
earnings-thereafter "fell precipitately" was not viewed by Judge
Posner as having experienced an adverse employment action.' 2 This
was despite the fact that the employer also forced the individual to enter
a "district coaching program," which required the employee:
To make special weekly reports and special written sales
presentations, even though he had only a short time to
familiarize himself with his new job and it was customary not to
put a salesman into such a program until he had been in his new
job for at least eight months."3

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
See Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270,273 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 272.
Id.
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Additionally, the salesman was told in writing that "'failure to show
improvement at any time during the program... [could] lead to further
disciplinary action,"'2- which, in Judge Posner's view, indicated
"contrary to the defendant's characterization, that the 'coaching'
program was disciplinary in nature."25
It is difficult to understand how the Seventh Circuit viewed the
senior salesman in Williams as suffering no actionable discrimination,
whereas the senior educators in Karlen and Solon, who were offered an
opportunity for additional benefits, were seen as victims of
discrimination.
This is especially true given that the question of
whether ERIPs constitute discrimination depends entirely on one's
perspective. For example, a common form of ERIP is a guarantee of
continuous health coverage until the employee qualifies for Medicare,
because the fear of becoming uninsurable once an employee's COBRA
rights expire is a major impedinient to early retirement." In such plans,
employers typically offer employees who reach a minimum eligibility
age for insurance under the group plan for a fixed number of years or
until Medicare eligibility, whichever occurs first.' Under such a plan,
an employee retiring at fifty-nine would receive more years of
employer-paid insurance than an employee retiring at sixty-two, and the
sixty-two year old may attempt to characterize this as "discrimination."
Yet from the perspective of the fifty-nine year old, it appears the sixtytwo year old got the best deal since he or she not only received full
insurance coverage but also a full salary between the ages of fifty-nine
and sixty-two.
Finally, the question of whether ERIPs represent an "adverse"
employment action must be viewed in light of Judge Posner's and the
254. Id.(emphasis in original).
255. Id.
256. It must be noted that in Karlen, it is not clear whether employees who did not
voluntarily retire lost any accrued sick leave benefits. See Karlen v. City Colls. of Chicago,
837 F.2d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Karlen v. City Coils. of Chicago, No. 84-C2925,
1986 WL 14649 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 12, 1986). The authors would not condone any ERIP that
involuntarily stripped employees of accrued benefits. However, it is clear in Solon that the
employees challenging the plan in question did not lose any accrued benefits, yet the Seventh
Circuit still found adverse action. Solon v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 180 F.3d 844 (7th Cir.
1999) ("The disadvantage employees over the age of 58 experience is the withdrawal of a
'carrot' rather than the sting of a 'stick.'').
257. In the authors' experience this is reflected by the fact that health insurance benefits
are central to most ERIPs in Wisconsin school districts.
258. This has been the authors' experience in reviewing numerous collective bargaining
agreements in Wisconsin and, based on the authors' conversations with numerous other
management and union attorneys, appears to be a trend in other states as well.
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Seventh Circuit's well-known "law and economics perspective," which
dictates that courts should not upset "free-market" transactions or
allocation of benefits unless clearly required to act. 9
Prior to Karlen, there would have been little question that the
Seventh Circuit would view ERIPs as a typical, noncoercive free-market
transaction. After all, in a truly voluntary ERIP, an employee is simply
given the option of choosing between two forms of compensation. An
employee may choose to continue to sell his labor to his current
employer at his current rate; or, in exchange for specified benefits, the
employee may choose to release his employer from any continuing
obligation to employ him, and thereby regain his time to sell or use
elsewhere. As the Seventh Circuit held in Henn, when an employer
offers an early retirement incentive:
This may put [the employee] to a hard choice; he may think the
offer too good to refuse; but it is not Don Corleone's 'Make him
an offer he can't refuse'.... The question 'Would you prefer
$100,000 to $50,000?' will elicit the same answer from everyone,
but it does not on that account produce an 'involuntary'
259. See Paul H. Brietzke & Linda S. Whitton, An Old(er) Master Stands on the
Shoulders of Ageism to Stake Another Claim for Law and Economics, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 89,
89-90 (1996) (reviewing Richard A. Posner's recent book--on age no less-and quoting
Posner for the claim "that economics can do a better job of explaining the behavior and
attitude associated with aging, and of solving the policy problems that aging presents, than
biology, psychology, sociology, philosophy, or any other single field of natural or social
science").
Indeed, another review of Judge Posner's book describes one of the foundations of Judge
Posner's law and economics perspective-rational choice theory-as the notion that "people
are rationally self-interested decisionmakers; they are capable of computing the costs and
benefits of the various alternatives open to them; and they seek to choose that alternative that
is likely to give them the greatest happiness." Thomas S. Ulen, The Law and Economics of
the Elderly, 4 ELDER L. J. 99, 109 (1996).
Remarkably-in light of Judge Posner's decision in Karlen, and the changes in the law it has
triggered-Judge Posner's book on aging stands in stark contradiction to the principles that
appear to motivate his Karlen decision. RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE
(1995). Posner catalogues numerous differences between age as a protected category and
other categories. Id. at 320. In fact, Posner goes so far as to
argue that the age discrimination law is largely ineffectual but to the extent it is
effective, it has a perverse impact both on the welfare of the elderly and on the
equality of income and wealth across the entire population. The age discrimination
law is at once inefficient, regressive, and harmful to the elderly.
Id. at 319.
At bottom, Posner's focus solely on "economic efficiency" seems to have undermined his
attempts to apply discrimination law and to articulate conceptually consistent principles.
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response. 6
There is no question that an ERIP requires employees to make a
choice; however, the required choice is no more onerous than numerous
other employment decisions. Should I continue on the day shift or work
the night shift for greater pay? Should I relocate to accept a promotion?
In real life, employees are rarely offered benefits that do not entail
some reciprocal "cost." Most free-market transactions entail and
sometimes require "consideration" for receiving a benefit.6 Yet Karlen
requires that in the context of ERIPs, and ERIPs alone, employees must
receive the benefit of early retirement incentives cost free.26 As the
Seventh Circuit later stated in Solon:
Nor does it matter that each of the plaintiffs could have retired
within the framework of the ERIPs and received the maximum
available benefits. The point of the plaintiffs' case is not that
they were never eligible for the incentives, but that the terms of
the plans put them to an unlawful choice."
But the Seventh Circuit never articulated why this one choice, amid
the myriad of employee choices, should be singled out and judicially
removed from the available employer-employee transactions.2 ' Indeed,
in many ways the choice offered in an ERIP is far less problematic than
the commonplace bilateral settlement made with an older worker in an
individual age discrimination case, in which the worker forfeits his or
her litigation rights in exchange for some monetary or non-monetary
consideration. Provided the statutory waiver requirements are met,6
such settlements are not only legally permissible, but encouraged. An
ERIP is simply a lower stakes version of the same transaction.
Employees forfeit their rights to litigate employment issues, yet unlike
260. Henn v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 826 (7th Cir. 1987).
261. Rather than undertaking a case-by-case analysis of which workers should be retired
with the attendant morale and potential litigation costs, the employer allows employees in a
targeted group to make the choices. However, in return for undertaking management's work,
the employees demand additional consideration: a perfectly reasonable free-market

transaction.
262. Karlen v. City Coils. of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314,320 (7th Cir. 1988).
263. Solon v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 180 F.3d 844, 853 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted).
264. Indeed, this statement is merely circular in that it attempts to argue that such a
choice is unlawful by simply calling it an "unlawful choice."
265. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
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the typical litigation scenario, employees are not subject to individual
pressures and are not facing the threat of immediate or potential loss of
employment.266
These observations are particularly true if the ERIP is collectively
bargained. In such a situation, not only are employees protected by
their right to simply refuse to retire,' 6' but the plan itself has been
screened and approved by the employee's bargaining representatives.
Since unions are generally controlled by their union members-most
often by senior members-it seems highly unlikely that these members
would negotiate and approve a plan that is contrary to the interests of
older workers. 26 The Seventh Circuit itself has shown a willingness to
uphold collective bargaining agreements even in the face of allegations
that they may restrict the "rights" of a protected class.z9 There is no
reason similar deference should not be accorded to collectively
bargained ERIPs. Indeed, the authors believe ERIPs represent
something potentially valuable to both employers and employees, in
which both sides make trade-offs. The employer seeks to save money;
employees seek to gain added free time.70 Therefore, under the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning in other contexts, such transactions should be
favored, not struck down as discriminatory.
D. Is the Outcome in Karlen Consistentwith CongressionalIntent?
It should be clear by this point that, if Karlen was intended to
represent a general model for evaluating ERIPs, it is conceptually
flawed and inconsistent with other discrimination law. Yet, proponents
of Karlen-which now include the Seventh Circuit in its recent Solon
decision, as well as the EEOC-undoubtedly will argue that, in the end,
266. However, it is true that this analysis applies only to employees who choose to take
advantage of the plan. This analysis does not apply to individuals, such as those in Karlen,
who believe they have "lost" benefits as a result of deciding not to participate in the plan.
Yet once again, under the Chicago school's typical analysis, why would an employee expect a
pecuniary gain from the employer in a situation in which the employee has not provided the
employer with any commensurate economic benefit?
267. Including, in addition to federal and state employment law, their contractual just
cause protections.
268. In fact, it has been the authors' experience that the greatest support for ERIPs
comes from older members of the bargaining unit, some of whom seek participation on
bargaining teams precisely to attempt to negotiate favorable ERIPs.
269. Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041,1051-52 (7thCir. 1996).
270. It can be argued that what the employer really seeks is the ability to transfer the
onus of a difficult employment decision from management to the employees themselves. But,
of course, this transfer of responsibility comes at a cost to the employer which is priced by the
terms of the added incentives.
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it does not matter whether Karlen is internally consistent, whether it is
sound industrial policy, or even whether subatomic particles are
predictable. The only relevant issue is what Congress intended. Are
ERIPs that reduce benefits based on age lawful under the OWBPA?
Unfortunately, the answer to this key question is not readily
apparent from the text or legislative history, given that it appears
Congress was almost intentionally vague on this difficult issue. " '
Indeed, in the recent Erie County decision, the court threw up its hands
and concluded that the legislative history could support a wide variety
of, and even completely conflicting, interpretations of OWBPA.m The
reason for this vagueness is, in part, political. Congress was seeking to
please numerous powerful political constituencies-employers, unions,
and the AARP to name but a few. But perhaps more significantly,
Congress was not able to fully develop, much less articulate, a
conceptual basis separating lawful from unlawful age-based retirement
plans. Nevertheless, a historical analysis of the changes in ADEA and
OWBPA suggests that Congress did not intend to make voluntary agebased ERIPs unlawful. Unfortunately, although Congress has shown
that it recognizes that ERIPs are different from other age distinctions,
Congress did not clearly tell courts how and why ERIPs are different,
and how these differences should affect courts' analyses of ERIPs.
The early legislative history of the ADEA has been discussed
above!'
This history resumed in 1989 with Public Employees
Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts,274 the Supreme Court's second
skirmish with Congress following McMann. Betts involved an ADEA
challenge of a retirement plan-importantly, not a voluntary ERIP-in
which employees under age sixty when disabled received disability
retirement benefits, whereas individuals over age sixty when disabled
did not receive such benefits. 5 The employer relied on the
section 623(f)(2) defense that the plan was a bona fide retirement plan
that was not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act; the plaintiff
271. See, e.g., Erie County Retirees Ass'n v. County of Erie, 220 F.3d 193, 205-09 (3d
Cir. 2000) (citing conflicting statements in OWBPA's legislative history).
272. It is important to note that Erie was not a voluntary case, but rather a unilateral
change in retirement benefits by the employer. Id. at 197. Thus, the Erie court attempted to
divine Congress's intent with regard to a more stringent standard than should be applied to
ERIPs.
273. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
274. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
275. I& at 162. The consequence of this was that a younger employee with comparable
service and salary would have received $355 per month in disability retirement benefits,
whereas the plaintiff, who was over sixty, received only $158.50 per month. Id. at 163.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:587

in turn argued that the employer had not demonstrated "equal benefit
or equal cost." 276 The Supreme Court, in a highly technical and literal
analysis similar to that in McMann, rejected the validity of the "equal
benefit or equal cost" test and held that the plan was legal 7m The Court
further held that section 623(f)(2) placed the burden on the plaintiff to
prove that the employer intended to discriminate because of age. 8
As with the Court's earlier decision in McMann, Congress effectively
overruled Betts with the passage of OWBPA of 1990.29 In OWBPA,

Congress codified the "equal benefit or equal cost" principle for
employee benefit plans in section 623(f)(2)(B)(i); however, in doing so
Congress created a new subsection, section 623(f)(2)(B)(ii), which
distinguished voluntary ERIPs from other benefit plans, and which
exempted such plans from the equal benefit or equal cost test.8
276. Id. at 164.
277. Id. at 170-75, 182. Note that the "equal benefit or equal cost" test rejected by
McMann was the same test relied upon in striking down the ERIP at issue in Karlen. See
Karlen v. City Colls. of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1988).
278. Betts, 492 U.S. at 181.
279. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et. seq (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
280. Regarding the prohibition on age discrimination, section 623 states:
(f) Lawful practices; age an occupational qualification; other reasonable factors; laws
of foreign workplace; seniority system; employee benefit plans; discharge or
discipline for good cause.
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment
organization-

agency, or labor

(2) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) of
this section(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan(i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount of payment
made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less than that made or
incurred on behalf of a younger worker, as permissible under section 1625.10,
title 29, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on June 22, 1989); or
(ii) that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consistent with the
relevant purpose or purposes of this chapter.
Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), no such employee benefit
plan or voluntary early retirement incentive plan shall excuse the failure to hire any
individual and no such employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary
retirement of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this title, because of the
age of such individual. An employer, employment agency, or labor organization
acting under subparagraph (A), or under clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), shall
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Congress' decision to relieve ERIPs from the "equal cost" test seems to
strongly suggest that employers are to be given wide latitude in
providing voluntary retirement incentives for older workers.2' In other
words, Congress signaled that voluntary ERIPs differ from other agebased employment decisions, and should be subjected to less scrutiny.
This approach is consistent with the original approach in the ADEA and
the decisions of all courts but the Seventh Circuit.
However, the legislative history of section 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) confuses
matters immensely, because it suggests a number of differing-and even
contradictory-approaches to ERIPs, and glosses over the conceptual
subtleties of the previous precedents. In the words of one commentator,
"[t]he legislative history condemns ERIPs even as it encourages
them." m In the end, the legislative history of OWBPA in many ways
resembles a Rorschach inkblot test upon which one projects one's own
beliefs about ERIPs; ultimately how one views the legislative history
hinges primarily upon whether one believes ERIPs are truly
"discriminatory."
The legislative history begins by reinforcing the idea that
section 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) gives greater latitude to employers by
identifying the original three purposes of the ADEA,m including
"help[ing] employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment."m But then the legislative
history takes a puzzling turn: it states that ERIPs "that deny or reduce
benefits to older workers while continuing to make them available to
younger workers may encourage prematuredeparture from employment
by older workers. ' 's Yet-as the name implies-all early retirement
incentive programs are designed to encourage employees to retire prior
to the employee's otherwise intended retirement date; otherwise ERIPs
become severance programs and employers may simply not implement
them.2 Thus, the authors believe that Congress meant "premature" to
have the burden of proving that such actions are lawful in any civil enforcement
proceeding brought under this chapter, or ....
29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
281. In fact, because Congress only "overruled" the Betts decision with respect to benefit
plans, arguably Betts-and its stringent subterfuge test requiring intent-is still good law for
ERIPs under section 623(f)(2)(B)(ii).
282. Stith & Kohlburn, supra note 210, at 263 n.4.
283. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
284. S. REP. No. 101-263, at 28 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1533.
285. Id. (emphasis added).
286. Severance plans are designed for a related, but nevertheless distinct purpose from
ERIPs. Severance plans typically provide benefits to employees in situations where they are
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be synonymous with "forced" or "involuntary;"'' however, "premature"
certainly can be read to suggest more. This broader inference is
supported by a number of favorable references to Karlen in the
legislative history.'
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether Congress cites to Karlen

because of its specific "bad facts" and the related "voluntariness" issues,
or more broadly for its apparent condemnation of any reference to age.
The legislative history compounds this ambiguity by going on to quote
Cipriano II for the proposition that "'the fact that plaintiffs would
eventually retire at some point in their careers is not the type of
justification sufficient to authorize overt discrimination based on
age.' "m The significance of this passage is not clear given that the
Cipriano II court only found for the plaintiffs on the issue of
voluntariness-i.e., the plan was not made available to the plaintiffs,

who were past the eligibility age when it was implemented.'

The

Cipriano II court held that the plan itself was bona fide and not a

subterfuge under section 623(f)(2),291 even though the ERIP in question
cut off benefits at age sixty-five. 292 Thus, citing Cipriano could be

involuntarily (and often unexpectedly) terminated because of individual performance
problems or because of financial problems faced by the employer. One could argue that
ERIPs could still be meaningful if age were replaced with a less controversial criterion such as
years of service. However,-as argued below, such a move would be less precise and, in light of
the fact that any factor that keeps the "early" in ERIP is highly correlated with age, clearly
disingenuous.
287. In one section of the legislative history, Congress states that "as the Seventh Circuit
commented in Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago '[t]o withhold benefits from older persons in
order to induce them to retire seems precisely the form of discrimination at which the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act is aimed."' (internal citations omitted). S. REP. No. 101263, at 27 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1533 (citations omitted). This suggests
that Congress was, at least in this section, focused on the possibility that accrued benefits
were actually stripped from older employees in Karlen in order to force them to retire.
288. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101-263 at 12 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1059,
1517 ("And in Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit ruled that an employer
'had better be able to prove a close correlation between age and cost' in order to justify a
substantial reduction in early retirement incentive benefits based on age.") (citations
omitted). Of course, as noted above, the Karlen court's holding actually required a more
stringent "equal benefit or equal cost" test that other courts and the EEOC do not endorse in
the context of ERIPs. See generally supra Part III.B. and note 228 and accompanying text.
Thus, Congress's reliance on this reference to Karlen is confusing at best.
289. S. REP. No. 101-263, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1533.
(quoting Cipriano v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Tonawanda, 700 F. Supp. 1199, 1211 (W.D.N.Y.
1988)).
290. CiprianoII, 700 F Supp. at 1211.
291. Id. at 1205.
292. Id. at 1201.
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reasonably interpreted as an attempt to distinguish voluntary ERIPs
from the involuntary, adverse treatment condoned by Betts. In effect,
Congress can be viewed as chiding the Supreme Court for failing in Betts
to use a classical view of age distinctions where one was required.
The legislative history then attempts to identify a number of types of
plans that would be permissible.' Yet once again these examples are
problematic. The first problem is that many of the plans identified by
the legislative history do not provide employees with a significant
incentive to retire early. For example, as described above, plans that are
based on years of service or that provide flat, one-time payments294 do
not provide incentives for only those employees who will benefit the
employer by leaving the workforce; thus, employers are unlikely to find
these options economically attractive or even feasible.
A second problem is that many of the plans identified in the
legislative history do "discriminate" or make distinctions based on age.
For example, the text of OWBPA permits the use of a minimum age for
the purposes of an ERIP.295 Once again, it appears that the framers of
the statute did not really intend to eliminate all distinctions based on age
within the protected group, otherwise use of a minimum age would not
be condoned. 29 Similarly, as noted in the discussion of Karlen, under a
purely classical discrimination analysis the legislatively and judicially
condoned use of years of service would be highly problematic, since
years of service are often highly correlated with age.2 7
293. S. REP. No. 101-263, at 28 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1533.
294. Id.
295. 29 U.S.C. § 623(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
296. "Minimum ages," under a strict application of a classical discrimination model,
would "discriminate" against all employees from age forty up to the age of eligibility; thus,
once again it appears that Congress did not intend that courts apply a "classical" analysis to
ERIPs.
297. S. REP. No. 101-263, at 28 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1533. Not
only is substituting years of service highly correlated to age, there are several weaknesses to
this approach. The foremost weakness is that indirect measurements such as years of service
reduce the benefit to the employer and many employees. The goal is to target employees
near, but not yet at, the typical retirement age. Some employees with many years of service
may still be too young to realistically consider retirement in light of the "normal retirement
age" used by governmental benefit programs; others nearing retirement age may not have
enough years of service. Once again, it is a valid generalization to suggest that in this society
people tend to retire sometime around age sixty-five, an assumption upon which our entire
Social Security system is based. It would not make sense for employers to encourage welltrained employees to leave in advance of when they are likely to retire, only to have them go
to work for the competition. Another weakness of relying on years of service is that there is
very little gain in terms of the elimination of societal prejudice against older workers by
simply substituting a different word for "age" if the ultimate goal is identical. What is needed
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Yet the legislative history of OWBPA also suggests that even more
blatant distinctions based on age can be tolerated if they are couched in
the correct terminology. For example, the legislative history indicates
that "imput[ing] years of service" is permissible.2 9 However, it is not
clear how merely using the term "impute" results in anything other than
a Karlen-type sliding scale plan. Plans that "impute" age establish a
normal retirement age (which in other parts of the legislative history is
drawn into question) and then pay younger employees more than older
employees in order to bring them up to this normal retirement age. The
practical result is almost indistinguishable from the plan rejected in
Karlen.

Moreover, one clearly articulated legal method to encourage
employees to retire early-windows-is far more problematic than the
typical "sliding scale" program.299 Under a "window" plan, all
employees having some specific combination of age plus years of
experience are offered a "blue light special" wherein they can receive
early retirement incentives if they act within a given time period.'
However, these plans force an employee to quickly respond to an "all or
nothing" proposal. By contrast to the steep "cliff" in most window
plans, the more traditional sliding scale plans offer a more gradual
decline in benefits that allows employees to continuously re-evaluate
their economic circumstances. Assuming Congress was motivated by a
desire to benefit older workers, sliding scales seem far more benign than
the legislatively sanctioned "window" plans.
In short, Congress' examples of permissible and impermissible only
further cloud the issue. As indicated, one partial explanation for the
inconsistencies and contradictions in the legislative history is that
Congress was attempting to simultaneously appease a number of
disparate constituencies."' The business community lobbied Congress
heavily,' and arguably prevailed when the Act permitted age
But another key
distinctions if justified by cost considerations.
constituency was the AARP. It seems that the AARP succeeded in
exploiting the confusion surrounding ERIPs for what it perceived as the
advantage of its members.3o3
is a sound theoretical rationale, not a series of haphazard compromises.
298. Id.
299. See Auerbach v. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 1998).
300. See, e.g., id.
301. See Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 82, at 818.
302. Id.
303. See Id. ("[T]he AARP had the floor and the Congressmen ....The legislative

2001]

EARLY RETIREMENT INCENTIVE PLANS

However, there is no reason to believe the AARP wanted to put
virtually all ERIPs at risk. The potential elimination of ERIPs was
precisely the fear voiced by the EEOC during the Senate hearings
leading to the passage of OWBPA, a fear seemingly now abandoned
given the EEOC's current position. During the Senate hearings
preceding the passage of OWBPA, both the vice-chairman and the
general counsel of the EEOC criticized the previous Senate version
because they feared it would inhibit employers from offering early
retirement incentives.' This testimony was one factor that led to the
amendment of the original version of the bill, which later became
section 623(f)(2)(b)(ii), to exempt early retirement incentive programs
from the "equal benefit or equal cost" test if an employer can prove that
the program "further[s] the purposes of the Act."M
In 1998, the ambiguity in the legislative history of the OWBPA was
heightened by the passage of the Higher Education Act."
This
amendment states in relevant part that an institution of higher learning
does not violate the ADEA solely by offering a tenured employee
"supplemental benefits upon voluntary retirement that are reduced or
eliminated on the basis of age. "m In effect, in 1998 Congress
legislatively overruled the Karlen decision, thus casting even further
doubt upon what meaning the reference to this case has in the legislative
history of OWBPA.
The statements made during the passage of the 1998 amendments
suggest that Congress-having recognized the ambiguities in the
legislative history of OWBPA-was merely clarifying its previous intent
to allow age distinctions within voluntary ERIPs.
Citing the
section 623(f)(2)(B)(ii)
affirmative defense ("'voluntary
early
retirement plans consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes of the
act' do not violate the ADEA's prohibition against age
discrimination"),' as well as the original purposes of the Act, the
committee concluded that:
history reflects this balance of power; the AARP alone managed to secure 225 pages worth of
testimony, while the combined interests of state pension funds, industry, and unions are
represented by fewer than 80 pages of testimony.") (footnotes omitted).
304. See S. REP. No. 101-263, at 28 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1557.
305. Id.
306. 29 U.S.C. § 623(m) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
307. Id.
308. Perhaps even more interesting than the fact that Karlen was legislatively overruled
is that the Solon court never mentioned this fact when relying extensively on Karlen in its
decision.
309. 29 U.S.C. § 623(m) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
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The legislative history of the Older Workers' Benefit Protection
Act of 1990 (OWBPA), which added section 4(f)(2) of the
ADEA, is reasonably clear that at least some voluntary early
retirement plans under which benefits are reduced or eliminated
based on age are consistent with the purposes of the ADEA and
are, therefore, encompassed by section 4(f)(2)(B)(ii). However,
the OWBPA report language is somewhat ambiguous on this
point.... The committee believes that the voluntary retirement
incentives encompassed by Title X do not conflict with the
purposes of the ADEA and that the ADEA should be amended
to make this clear and' to avoid unnecessary litigation on this
issue."'
The Committee report then lists a number of voluntary ERIP plans
that reduce benefits based on age and concludes by stating:
No inference is intended that these or other retirement incentive
plans or arrangements sponsored by institutions of higher
education or other employers do not constitute 'voluntary early
retirement incentive plan[s] consistent with the relevant purpose
or purposes of the [ADEA]' within the meaning of
[§] 4(f)(2)(B)(ii) of the ADEA, or are not otherwise lawful
without regard to this bill."'
In short, the legislative history of the ADEA and OWBPA clearly
demonstrate that Congress supported early retirement incentive
programs "consistent with purposes of the Act." Although the specific
scope of this protection was left unclear, the authors believe that
Congress could not have intended the results in Karlen and Solon
because neither actually benefits older workers-which, in the end, was
the purpose of the legislation.
Moreover, how one views the legislative history is substantially
determined by how one views age discrimination, in general, and the age
distinctions in ERIPs in particular. If one takes the Karlen approach
and views age distinctions in ERIPs as "classical" invidious
discrimination, then one can read the language of the legislative history
as prohibiting all age-based ERIPs. Yet both the ADEA and OWBPA
310.

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE,

105TH CONG.,

REPORT ON TITLE X-FACULTY RETIREMENT INCENTIVES (Comm. Print 1998).

311. Id.
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arguably reflect a more sophisticated approach to age discrimination,
one that recognizes that distinctions based on age cannot be judged by
classical discrimination principles in some contexts. This approach
recognizes that most, if not all, truly voluntary ERIPs are "consistent
with the purposes of the Act."
E. Compounding the Confusion: the Solon Decision
Karlen's analysis suggested a radical paradigm shift from prior
precedent dealing with ERIPs, and still remains an anomaly in the
Seventh Circuit's analysis of general discrimination law. Yet Karlen
itself is distinguishable because of its unusual facts; thus it was unclear
whether Karlen's strict application of classical discrimination principles
to ERIPs would be followed in a more benign factual environment. The
Seventh Circuit's 1999 decision in Solon v. Gary Community School
Corp. not only followed Karlen but expanded its rationale, even in the
absence of facts arguably suggesting discriminatory animus.
Solon contained a rather straightforward ERIP: early retirement
incentives were offered to teachers between the ages of fifty-eight and
sixty-two who had a minimum of fifteen years service. 314 Eligible
teachers who elected early retirement received multi-payments until age
316
sixty-two.3 15 The maximum amount of benefits was forty-eight months.
Thus, teachers who retired at age fifty-eight received the full benefit;
teachers who waited until age sixty-two received nothing."' The Solon
court found this plan to be discriminatory.3 8
The Solon court held that the employer had waived its
section 623(f)(2)(b)(ii) affirmative defense;3 9 arguably, if the defense
had been preserved, the Solon court may have applied the Cipriano
logic of looking at general employer cost-savings, and may have upheld
the plan. However, given the tone of the Solon decision, and its broad
312. 180 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 1999).
313. In fact, there was evidence that the plan had been implemented when the student
enrollment within the Gary Public School System dropped by one-third, which led to layoffs
among teachers and administrators. Id. at 847. The Solon court acknowledged that the "aim
of the plan was to induce teachers at the top of the pay scale to retire sooner than they would
otherwise, thereby enabling the school system to retain more teachers" with less seniority and
who therefore would earn smaller salaries. Id. at 847.
314. Id. at 847.
315. Id.
316. Id.

317. Id. at 852.
318. Id. at 851, 859.
319. Id. at 851.
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interpretation of Karlen, it seems likely the court would have struck
down the plan regardless of any evidence of general cost-savings, short
of a showing of "equal benefit or equal cost." In the end, the Solon
court follows Karlen and employs a virtually unmodified classical
discrimination analysis, scrutinizing the ERIP as closely as it would
involuntary, adverse treatment directed at groups covered by classical
discrimination theory.
The court acknowledged that the employer was not attempting to
punish older would-be retirees, and that the plan in question simply
represented the "withdrawal of a 'carrot.'"" Yet the court, guided by
classical discrimination principles, concluded that this "makes no
3 ' Nor did the court find it
difference to the analysis.""
significant that
the plan was completely voluntary, and that each would-be retiree at
some point had access to the full incentive. In the words of the court:
It may well be true that teachers and administrators who choose
not to retire suffer no loss in position, salary, or other benefits;
indeed they will almost certainly earn more in salary and benefits
by continuing to work than they have forfeited by declining to
retire at age 58 to 61. The same was no doubt true in Karlen.
Indeed, the Solon court arguably goes beyond Karlen. This is seen
most clearly in the court's attempt to completely individualize
retirement incentives:
Nor does it matter that each of the plaintiffs could have retired
within the framework of the ERIPs and received the maximum
available benefits ....Employees are offered incentives to retire
sooner than they otherwise plan, but "early" retirement is
defined exclusively in terms of age. Yet one's ability to retire is
typically dependent on a host of factors other than age: one's
years of service with the employer (which will typically affect
pension benefits), savings, dependents, health, and so on.
Consequently, not all 58-year-olds will be equally situated to
retire. One 58-year-old might have already completed thirty
years of service with Gary Schools, for example, and as a result
have earned the level of pension benefits that allows him to
retire, but it might take a more recent employee who is also 58
320. Id. at 853.
321. Id.
322. Id
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and has similar financial needs another several years to reach
that same level. The first could elect to retire at once and receive
four years of incentive payments; the second would have to
continue working and as a result forfeit some or all of the early
retirement payments. In this way the ERIPs treat employees
who are similarly situated in terms of their preparedness to retire
differently, depending on their age.'
Here, because of its adherence to classical discrimination principles,
the Solon court inverts reality. Although the court suggested that the
"ERIPs treat employees who are similarly situated in terms of their
preparedness to retire differently, depending on their age,"' in reality,
the ERIP treats each individual equally at age fifty-eight. Upon
reaching age fifty-eight, each individual has an opportunity to take
advantage of all the benefits of the plan.' The differences individuals
bring with them to the plan, which as the court rightly pointed out
involve a number of factors, undoubtedly affect any individual's ability
to retire at any given age; however, none of these individual differences
are within the control of the employer, and it seems manifestly unfair to
penalize an employer for factors beyond its control.
Not only is such an approach onerous to the employer, it simply is
not workable and will doom most ERIPs. Almost by definition, any
generalized plan must be based on aggregate, not individualized,
assessments. Yet rather than viewing age "probabilistically" by
accepting valid generalizations about when people as a group tend to
retire, the Solon court mechanistically applies classical discrimination
principles and attempts to determine when each individual intended to
retire. In the end, this search for a precise gauge for individualized
retirement "measurements" will produce a perverse result: by requiring
employers to offer either individualized retirement plans or universal
severance plans-which provide equal benefits to all employees-the
Solon court will eventually succeed in eliminating most ERIPs, thereby
harming older workers as a class. This is precisely the sort of anomalous
result Kuhn would predict when a decision-maker clings to the wrong
paradigm.
323. Id. at 853 (citations omitted).
324. Id.
at 852.
325. ld.
326. Other post-OWBPA circuit court decisions dealing with ERIPs are more
sympathetic to such plans, although the jurisprudence is neither clear in its reasoning nor
predictable in its outcomes. In Lyon v. Ohio Education Association, 53 F.3d 135, 137 (6th Cir.
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IV. ERIPs AFTER SOLON: SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS ON WHAT
CONGRESS WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE, AND How COURTS SHOULD
DEAL WITH THE CURRENT UNCERTAINTIES

Congress, despite its failure to fully articulate it, recognized that age
is different from other categories, and that voluntary ERIPs in
particular are different from the classical discrimination found in Betts.
The passage of the 1998 Higher Education Act underscores the fact that

Congress was aware of some of the conceptual and practical problems in
Karlen and Solon, and intended courts to apply a non-classical model in
ruling upon sliding scale ERIPs. Recently there have been a number of
other developments that call out for a final and reasoned resolution of
this issue.
The booming economy has at least temporarily minimized the need

for ERIPs in the private sector.'V However, employers-especially the
school districts represented in many of the published ERIP decisionscontinue to face a variety of factors that make ERIPs look attractive.'
1995), the Sixth Circuit held that a plan that contains age distinctions in reference to normal
retirement at age sixty-two does not even raise a prima facie case of age discrimination
because it "imputes age" as condoned in the legislative history. The Second Circuit, on the
other hand, in its decision in Auerbach v. Board of Education, 136 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir.
1998), held that a plan that established a window at age fifty-five for all employees did present
a prima facie case of discrimination, in spite of the fact that "windows" are also specifically
condoned by the legislative history. Id. at 113. The Auerbach court itself did not
acknowledge that "windows" are specifically condoned by the legislative history. See supra
note 299 and accompanying text. However, the Auerbach court did acknowledge that the
section 4(f)(2)(B)(ii) defense could be sustained if the incentive plan was voluntary and
consistent with the ADEA's relevant purposes. Auerbach, 136 F.3d at 112. In each case,
different levels of scrutiny were applied to ERIPs, and both courts subjected the ERIPs in
question to less scrutiny than the court in Solon. However, the Auerbach court did indicate
that it would likely follow Karlen if confronted with the same facts. Auerbach, 136 F.3d at
114.
To make this situation even more intolerable, within the last year, the IRS has, in effect,
asserted that unless plans contain age caps, there will be extremely adverse tax consequences
to employees taking advantage of them. See 42 U.S.C. § 457(f) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); Tech.
Adv. Mem. 199903032. In Minnesota, this position had an immediate indirect impact on
approximately 10,000 education employees. Letter from Douglas Greenfield, NEA Attorney,
to Internal Revenue Service (Apr. 10, 2000) (on file with authors and with the MarquetteLaw
Review).

327. All of the labor attorneys with whom the authors have discussed this issue agree
that ERIPs are more prevalent in the public sector.
328. Much like the situation with institutions of higher learning and tenured faculty, K12 school districts employ numerous senior employees who have reached the top of their
salary schedules and have "just cause" protection against termination. Moreover, many
public schools face pressures from being required to provide ever-increasing programs for
special needs students, from revenue caps, and from privatization movements, to name but a
few.

2001]

EARLY RETIREMENT INCENTIVE PLANS

Great numbers of these plans exist throughout the country, and they are
now under attack. Perhaps in response to Solon, the EEOC appears to
have changed its approach to these plans and has recently begun broadscale prosecution of ERIPs.329 In a mere twelve years, the EEOC has
reversed the position that it took in Cipriano and-even in the face of
the Patterson decision in Minnesota-has begun enforcement activities
that effectively treat Solon as controlling national precedent.330
In fact, in a recently issued chapter of its compliance manual, the
EEOC is now carrying the classical discrimination approach in Solon to
its logical extreme 33 This is perhaps most clearly seen in the EEOC's
analysis of Social Security bridge payments. 32 In addition to the
requirements found in the text of the legislative history for Social
Security bridge payments, 333 the EEOC now requires an individualized
329. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
330. Id.
331. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISsION, COMPLIANCE MANUAL,

5801-50 (Commerce Clearing House ed., 2000).
332. Id. at 5828.
333. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999):

(I) Minimum age for retirement benefits not a violation; other lawful benefit
provisions. Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subsection (f)(2)(B) of this
section(1)It shall not be a violation of subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) solely because(B) a defined benefit plan (as defined in section 1002(35) of this title) provides for(ii) social security supplements for plan participants that commence before the age
and terminate at the age (specified by the plan) when participants are eligible to
receive reduced or unreduced old-age insurance benefits under title II of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and that do not exceed such old-age insurance
benefits.
Id.; see also S. REP. No. 101-263 at 21 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1526.
Third, the new section 4(1)(1)(C) authorizes a defined benefit pension plan to provide on
a permanent basis for social security "bridge payments" to plan participants who meet
the eligibility criteria. Typically, a social security bridge payment is a fixed monthly
payment intended to substitute for Social Security benefits that will become available to
the plan participant either at age sixty-two (eligibility for reduced Social Security
benefits) or age sixty-five (eligibility for unreduced Social Security benefits).
The Committee concludes that the payment of such supplemental pension benefits by a
defined benefit pension plan is lawful under this bill so long as the supplement does not
exceed the amount of the Social Security benefits.
It should be noted that a literal reading of the statute would condone the use of social security
bridge payments and Medicare-carve-outs only in the context of "defined benefit" plans.
However, even the Solon court does not appear to endorse such a technical interpretation.
Solon v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 180 F.3d 844, 854 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, it appears that even
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Social

Security

supplements must depend on that individual's work history. 334 Because
it appears that the EEOC "will be satisfied only if older retirees receive
no less in total benefits than similarly situated younger [retirees], the
calculation must focus on each younger [retiree's] own Social Security
entitlement."

33

The bridge payment "may not be based on an average

calculated for a group of employees. "33
Yet, as previously discussed, requiring individualized calculations,
particularly for larger employers, makes ERIPs unworkable.
Employers-particularly in a collective bargaining context-cannot craft
policies that must take into account ever-changing individual employee
retirement decisions and individual differences in work history. The
EEOC's adoption of classical discrimination principles creates a
similarly unworkable situation for plans attempting to coordinate early
retirement benefits with Medicare. 337

Regardless of how one views

ERIPs generally, the legislative history clearly supports the use of
Medicare carve-out plans if the total value of the benefit to older
retirees is equivalent to that of younger retirees3m Yet the examples in

the EEOC manual appear to require an individualized benefit-bybenefit analysis. 39 As a result, employers will be fearful to continue
plans either because of a bona fide fear of a legal challenge or, as a
in the current ERIP climate, social security bridge payments and Medicare carveouts may be
used in ERIPs as long as the plan complies with the other statutory requirements, which
require equal total benefits for "older" and "younger" retirees.
334. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 331, at 5828,5829.
335. Id. at 5829.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 5815-16.
338. S. Rep. No. 101-263, at 22 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1527.
339. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 331, at 5827. It is crucial to recognize
that the recent decision in Erie County Retirees Ass'n v. County of Erie, 220 F.3d 193 (3d Cir.
2000), which the EEOC cites in connection with Medicare carve-out plans in the context of
employee benefits, has nothing to do with voluntary ERIPs. Erie involved an involuntary
change in benefits for older employees after they had already retired. Id. at 197. This is far
different from the situation in a voluntary ERIP, in which any choice to accept Medicare
health benefits is known in advance and is entered into voluntarily.
In addition, the Erie court's attempt to distinguish Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604
(1993), again highlights the current chaotic state in age discrimination jurisprudence. The
authors do not intend to expand this Article to debate whether Hazen was correctly decided;
however, the authors suggest that Erie's purported distinction between "years of service,"
which it sees as not age-related, and Medicare, which it sees as age-surrogate, is hardly selfevident. Moreover, as a practical matter, it is likely that Hazen will impact older workers far
more adversely than the county's action in Erie. In Erie, at least the workers had some form
of insurance coverage; in Hazen they were completely denied their pension rights.
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pretext, to eliminate an employee benefit.
Such an unstable situation cannot last indefinitely. Soon the
Supreme Court will be forced to decide between classical discrimination
principles and a new set of principles for evaluating ERIPs. Based on
the text of OWBPA, the earlier teachings of the circuit courts, and the
Supreme Court's own view of age as a protected category-as seen in
McMann, Betts, and the Court's equal protection cases-it is likely that
the Solon decision itself will face the prospect of an early retirement.
However, the Supreme Court's analysis of ERIPs-particularly its
rationale for why they are legal or illegal-will be as important as the
results.
If courts hope to decide age discrimination claims in a predictable
manner that is consistent with the intent of Congress, courts must
develop a more sophisticated decisional framework. This framework
should make a reasoned assessment, at the summary judgment stage, of
whether age distinctions should trigger classical discrimination
principles. As a purely practical matter, such a decisional framework is
necessary because employers will refuse to offer ERIPs unless they are
confident that any challenge can quickly and inexpensively be defeated;
it does an employer little good to attempt to save money through a
voluntary ERIP if that same money will be lost in litigation. Perhaps
even more importantly, courts need to confront the important
conceptual issues in dealing with age discrimination claims and develop
a mechanism with which to make a reasoned, conceptually sound
decision. Otherwise the general validity of classical discrimination
theory may be called into question.
To this end, the authors suggest a modified version of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm that takes into consideration the
conceptual differences between ERIPs and other situations involving
"age" in which more classical principles of discrimination apply. At the
summary judgment stage, this paradigm should work as follows: courts
should not view age distinctions in ERIPs as direct evidence of age
discrimination.' However, although reference to age alone should not
trigger judicial scrutiny, a plaintiff challenging an ERIP should be able
to establish a primafacie case by presenting evidence that the plan was
involuntary.
340. As argued above, supra note 238, and accompanying text, arguably even the Karlen
decision did not view sliding sale ERIPs as direct evidence of age discrimination. Of course,
age discriminatory statements surrounding the implementation of an ERIP would still
constitute direct evidence.
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The cases in this area suggest two forms of involuntariness. First,
plaintiffs can show that the offer lacked procedural fairness if they were
either given inadequate time to consider the plan1 or were not
"grandfathered" into the plan. 42 Second, plaintiffs can show that a plan
was involuntary if the plan, or the conditions surrounding the plan,
coerced employees to sever their employment or suffer decreased
vested benefits.1 3 For example, a plan might cut off access to employersponsored insurance if the employee fails to accept the offer. For those
employees with a pre-existing medical condition, this would be the
proverbial "offer an employee could not refuse;" thus, the plan would
be deemed involuntary.
Although voluntary ERIPs lie outside the realm of classical
discrimination principles, proof of involuntariness would return the
analysis to the realm of classical discrimination. Thus, if the plaintiff
does make a prima facie showing of involuntariness, the burden of
production and persuasion' would shift to the defendant. The
defendant would then be required to make a showing, at trial, that the
plan was fully voluntary and that the plan was consistent with the
purposes of the ADEA-i.e., that it was motivated by a desire to reduce
costs or other legitimate factors-as required by section 623(f)(2)(B)(ii).
This latter showing should be satisfied by proof that the plan was
motivated by payroll savings or other similar cost considerations; in
other words, Karlen's more rigorous "equal benefit or equal cost" test
would not have to be met. If the defendant satisfies its burden for the
affirmative defense, the final burden of proving discrimination would
return to the plaintiff, who would be required to prove that the
employer's plan was not consistent with the purposes of the ADEA.3I5
However, there is another method of addressing this issue that
would reduce the judiciary's need to determine the scope of
discriminatory conduct under OWBPA. Congress itself should further
clarify OWBPA so that there is no doubt that reducing benefits based
on age within the context of all purely voluntary ERIPs is legal. The
plain text of OWBPA treats voluntary ERIPs differently from other

341.
342.
1988).
343.
344.
345.
speaking,

See Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1987).
See Cipriano v. Bd. of Educ. of North Tonawanda, 700 F. Supp. 1199 (W.D.N.Y.
See Bodnar v. Synol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1988).
See Karlen v. City Coils. of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314,319 (7th Cir. 1988).
It is debatable how the plaintiff would make this showing but, at least practically
the plaintiff would likely need to prove that the employer intended to discriminate.
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benefit plans, and explicitly holds ERIPs to a lower standard. 6
Moreover, as seen above, the text and legislative history of the 1998
Higher Education amendments provide further evidence that Congress
never intended age distinctions within voluntary ERIPs to be viewed as
discrimination.f 7 Congress should return to this issue and complete the
job it started in the text of OWBPA and the 1998 Higher Education
amendments by expressly sanctioning the use of sliding scale voluntary
ERIPs by all employers.m Congress should explicitly state that it is
clarifying its intent to permit purely voluntary ERIPs that provide
benefits that are reduced or eliminated on the basis of age. In doing so,
Congress should specify that it is retroactively validating existing ERIPs
that are in compliance with the legislation.
In summary, until the legal system recognizes that truly voluntary
ERIPs simply do not constitute "discrimination," courts, employers, and
employees will be harmed by the Seventh Circuit's narrow and
inconsistent view of the discrimination universe. In Solon, the Seventh
Circuit "intuitively -"9 realized that the results generated by its paradigm
simply did not make sense. Much like the quantum physicists at the turn
of the century, the Seventh Circuit had the opportunity-when
confronted with data that did not make sense-to develop a new
paradigm to explain a poorly understood phenomenon. Unfortunately,
when confronted with the anomalous consequences of ERIPs, the court
responded by clinging even more tightly to the "classical" discrimination
model that had been intentionally or unintentionally applied in Karlen.
However, Solon's rigidity in applying the classical discrimination
model was a direct result of Congress' and the prior precedent's failure
to articulate a clear, conceptual basis explaining why age-based ERIPs
should not be viewed as discrimination. It is hoped that this Article will
provide this basis. Courts must recognize that distinctions based on age
are complex and must be analyzed carefully. It is far too easy to treat
age discrimination as either identical to, or completely different from,
other forms of invidious discrimination. In either case, unreasonable
and unintended results will follow.

346. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
347. 29 U.S.C. § 623(m) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). See also supra notes 306-11 and
accompanying text.
348. This is especially true in the case of K-12 school systems. Public schools present
equal or greater cost considerations, and essentially the same issues of tenure.
349. Solon v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 180 F.3d 844, 855-56 (7th Cir. 1999).
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